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ABSTRACT 
Several experiences of sudden large scale disruptions in electrical service deeply 
impacted both social stability and economic development in affected communities 
and caused lower levels of reliability performance. The prevention of such 
catastrophic incidents poses huge challenges for reliability study and operational 
practices in Buffalo City’s sub-transmission network. Primarily investigations on 
the field shows, aging infrastructure, relay failures and reactive maintenance 
practice is eminent. Inspired by these challenges, this dissertation proposes an 
analysis of the critical transition in sub-transmission network from a lower level of 
reliability to an economically and acceptable level of reliability. The transition of 
the operational “stress” and its large scale of power interruptions are studied. The 
transition of the existing sub-transmission to the alternative sub-transmission 
models has been presented. The analysis of load flow and fault level calculations 
identifies the loading trends critical to cause operational “pressure” of unplanned 
interruptions. The results in this research work had to discover the most appropriate 
resolutions to aging equipment, reactive maintenance and protection systems.  The 
DIgSILENT Power Factory simulates and quantifies the results of the problems 
that could occur in the sub-transmission network in the immediate future. Measures 
to mitigate any occurrence which might cause more prone to a catastrophic 
blackout are presented. The proposed corrective measures of upkeep aging 
infrastructure, relay responsiveness and planned preventative maintenance have 
been recommended. The development of these corrective measures and the 
proposed network model is the key to reaching higher levels of reliability 
performance in the energy supply that communities require in Buffalo City 
Metropolitan Municipality. 
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                   CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Continuous electricity supply is imperative for living in urban area. Any form of 
power interruptions cause dissatisfaction in the lives of people.  Power interruption 
can be either planned or unplanned nature. This chapter is the overview of regular 
unplanned power outages that lead to the need to review the reliability performance 
of dependability and security of Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality 
(BCMM)’s sub-transmission as a whole and the infeed in particular, to identify a 
relevant problem statement and the research questions that guide the investigations 
in this dissertation.  
BC is the electrical energy service provider to the City of East London. The BC’s 
network is known as Stafford/Progress/Stoney Drift line. This network supply 
electricity to the two main distribution hubs namely Progress and Stoney Drift 
substations. Stoney Drift substation distribute supply to the main switch houses for 
further distribution including Chiselhurst switch house. Detailed overview of BC’s 
sub-transmission network is presented in chapter 3. 
 
1.1 Problems of loss of supply 
The reliability problems on power system network is the persisting outages 
including blackouts. The nature of the problems may be protection failures, lack of 
maintenance and lack of design imperatives. These lack of design essentials range 
from; no circuit breakers are made available for the protection of the outgoing 
feeders from Stafford, no circuit breakers to protect the incoming feeders to Stoney 
Drift substation, to no infeed circuit breakers to Stafford switchyard; reliability is 
jeopardise in Stafford switchyard, Stoney Drift substation and the entire network 
at large in BC. The other latent problems are the aging power system infrastructure, 
nonexistence of pilot wires between Stafford switchyard and Stoney Drift 
substation, and lack of planned preventative maintenance. 
A blackout incident may be caused as a result of protection limitations: 
● Protection system failure to operate quickly enough and selectively in a presence 
 of a fault. 
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● Inadvertent operation during conditions where no system or plant fault is present.  
Whilst the first failure mode is self-explanatory, an interesting and actual example 
of the second failure mode was experienced in Chiselhurst switch house (adjacent 
Stoney Drift substation) and Progress substation on Buffalo City’s (BC’s) 132 kV 
sub-transmission network on 18th March 2006 and 11th March 2008 respectively. 
This event highlighted the need for a review of the whole system, particularly of 
the protection systems. 
         
1.2 Unreliability 
In power supply networks, the generation of power and the electrical load or 
demand side must be very close to equal every second since instantaneous equality 
is necessary for system stability.  The components used to automatically detect 
overloads, earth fault and short circuit to disconnect circuits at risk of damage are 
the protective relays and fuses. However, under certain conditions, the shutting 
down of a component can cause current fluctuations in the network neighbouring 
segments leading to a failure of a larger section. For instance, this may range from 
a building to a block, to an entire city and to an entire electrical grid. The 
persistence (for instance in 2009/2010 financial year, 374 high voltage (HV) faults 
outage was recorded)  of the regular power system outages is the key reason for 
unreliability problems and power interruptions which has imparted on industrial, 
commercial and domestic customers and utility’s cost as well as quality of service.   
 
1.3 Causes of power interruptions 
It is important to know about the possible cause of power outages in order to better 
protect the utility’s system and businesses from its devastating effects. The power 
outage can be forced (unplanned) or unforced (planned) interruption. The 
unplanned interruptions are due to failures in the system caused by:  
     ● Inherent factors, such as aging of the infrastructure, manufacturing defects and 
lack of maintenance; 
● Environmental factors includes, trees, wind, birds/animals, ice, lightning; and 
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●   Human errors, such as vehicular accident, operating err, and accident caused by 
utility personnel or contractor crew [1 & 2].  The causes of many persisting outages 
in BCMM may often directly relate to quality of service and reliability problems. 
The contributory factors to power interruption problems in BC may be as follows:  
● Aging of equipment and infrastructure 
● Lack of planned preventative maintenance of existing infrastructure 
●  Inability to upgrade and reinforce existing network 
● Protection system failures 
● Failure of communication equipment 
● Protection relay grading 
● Vandalism and theft of infrastructure 
● Inclement of weather conditions 
● Manpower shortages 
These unsatisfactory event of Chiselhurst switch house (adjacent Stoney Drift 
substation) and Progress substation highlighted the dire need to review the 
problems on the system including protection failures and lack of planned 
preventative maintenance. 
The reliability of sub-transmission system in Buffalo City may not be satisfactory 
since there are number of outages occurred regularly on the network. The 
functionality of an automatic devices known as protective relays and fuses for 
discrimination and disconnection of faulty equipment on the network may be non-
responsive. The role played by power system protection in power blackouts 
situation is important. The protection is designed to detect specific types of primary 
plant fault and initiate rapid disconnection of the faulty component. However, 
many major faults have been occurred on the Stafford switchyard and Stoney Drift 
sub-transmission network and two previous power blackouts have been 
catastrophic. There are several reasons for such a situation to exist. Both the 
incorrect response of protection systems to faults and the operation of relays in the 
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absence of faults introduced above, contribute to the problems in BC. There are 
other reasons contributed to the situation.  
Firstly, demand for electricity has increased steadily for decades, yet transmission 
lines that transport power from infeed to customers have not been refurbished or 
upgraded at the same pace. As a result, the grid has become vulnerable, making it 
more prone to blackouts, which have risen in number and severity [3]. 
 
Secondly, the lack of incentive in investing in new transmission facilities and the 
absence of effective cost recovery mechanisms for transmission investments has 
caused serious problem of transmission inadequacy [4]. The expectation of 
electricity distribution industry (EDI) restructuring initiatives of establishing 
regional electricity distribution (RED) to ring fence Municipality electricity 
distribution business to be financially viable was discontinued. The RED was 
formally established in July 2005 and ended in 2010/2011 financial year; after six 
years. The objectives and benefits includes improvements in efficiency, 
rationalisation of tariffs, electrification and sustainability [5].  The initiative 
activities, such as restructuring and re-regulation, are needed to reach the 
objectives, but are often expressed as an end-objectives or not materialised. 
 
In many cases, an initial incident results in the disconnection of a small amount of 
faulty primary plant. For instance, a fault occurred on the down-stream of a 
transformer will cause sectional failure. The incident may then escalate, either 
because the removal of primary plant item imposes additional stresses on the 
overall network, or because the initial incident cannot be contained and the 
consequences of the initial fault progressively spread into the rest of the power 
system and non-responsiveness of protective device may be resulted in blackouts.  
The two major faults (Progress substation and Chiselhurst switch house) among 
many occurrence on BC’s network, are characteristic of a more generally 
unacceptable level of performance. For example 374 HV fault outages was 
recorded in one financial year (2009/2010).  The electric service power 
interruptions and the impact on consumers such as domestic, commercial and 
industrial is presented in appendix B. Figure 1.1 below depicts system diagram of 
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infeed circuit breakers situated in Eskom’s Buffalo substation and Stafford 
switchyard.  
 
Figure 1.1: System diagram of the infeed and Stafford/Stoney Drift/Progress 
arrangement with two circuit breakers. 
 
1.4 Possibilities for improvement 
A reliable power system is an effective mechanism for industrial and economic 
growth, emergency services, household use, farming, education etc. To achieve 
that, BC’s sub-transmission must maintain to an acceptable level of reliability 
performance and the frequency of power interruption must be reduced. The 
reduction of power outage frequency may be achieved through refurbishment, 
maintenance strategy, relevant protection scheme, proper discrimination, correct 
grading and setting of protection relays, staff compliment and reinstate of pilot 
wires. The reliability improvement of power system is very complex with many 
technologies, such as smart-grid etc., and other strategies available. However, there 
is a need to follow a structured approach to the research to find relevant solutions. 
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1.5 Problem statement 
The improvement of sub-transmission system’s reliability is essential, since it is 
impossible to eliminate completely random faults and failures from BC’s sub-
transmission network, it is necessary to measure security and perform analysis, 
then take measures to reduce the likelihood that disturbances degenerate into major 
blackouts and prepare a structure for investigation. 
 
1.6 Research questions 
To improve reliability performance, the frequency of power outages must be 
reasonably decreased to an economically acceptable level. In order to achieve that, 
the following research questions have been raised to guide the investigation of this 
research. 
1. How can evaluation and upkeep of aged infrastructure improve reliability? 
2. Is there any significant relationship between relay responsiveness and reliability 
improvement? 
3. How can planned preventative maintenance make a difference in reliability 
improvement? 
4. How can blackouts mitigation and possibly prevention improve reliability? 
5. What is the reasonable cost for reliability improvement? 
The exploration of the above questions will confirm the importance of reliability 
improvement; to investigate the sub-transmission network and help determine a 
structure that might lead to insight and solutions to validate the research questions.  
 
1.7 Methodology 
The research may be broadly described as an investigation into BC’s sub- 
transmission protection system, system dependability and maintenance. The 
records of past practical problems of unreliability will be explored and investigated. 
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There is a planning study, data acquisition, and exploration phases. Within the 
study phase, facets of the research topics are explored.  
 
In the data acquisition stage, factors of influence for sub-transmission protection, 
security, dependability and maintenance are identified and their relationships are 
explored. The drivers of influence linking or relating to the performance of sub-
transmission reliability are also explored. Data acquisition may be carried out by 
expert interviews of distribution personnel, site visitations and existing reports.  
  
In the second phase, review and blackouts happenings on the sub-transmission 
network; and various aspects of factors of influence affecting the reliability 
performance on the network may be investigated. BC’s sub-transmission and main 
component of the network system will be reviewed. 
 
In the third phase of the research, discussions on a desk study of possible solutions, 
and selection of best solution that uses decision making approach may be 
implemented.  The exploration of protective equipment reliability performance; 
security, dependability and maintenance may be reviewed by combining fault 
current calculations and protection settings is the fourth phase of the research. It is 
possible to explore the effects of these combination of strategies on the 
performance of equipment and profitability of the BC’s network. Work out 
recommendations based on the above mentioned investigations. Preliminary 
analysis indicates a study of the pilot protection system could make a difference to 
the reliability improvement. The load flow, fault current calculations and protection 
settings need to be reviewed. These will lead to a plan that will deliver necessary 
reliability improvement. The methodology employed for this research offers 
significant potential for application to a range of power system reliability problems.  
 
1.8 Organisation of the dissertation 
This dissertation contains seven chapters and is organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 provides a basic introduction to the research as well as the problems, the 
causes and the possible improvement as the reasons behind this research. This 
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chapter also includes research methodologies, problem statement and research 
questions to guide the research to the knowledge of power system reliability.  
 
Chapter 2 presents literature review of aging infrastructure, unresponsiveness of 
protective relay. This chapter also review the literature on maintenance strategy, 
mitigation and prevention of blackouts and cost of reliability as well as customer 
satisfaction. 
 
Chapter 3 elaborate on the overview of BC’s sub-transmission network, the source 
of supply, the main transmission equipment, BC’s protection scheme 
categorisation of problems and the case study of experienced blackouts on the sub-
transmission network.  
 
In chapter 4, load flow analysis of the sub-transmission network was carried out. 
The overhead lines, transformers, tap changers etc. were modelled and simulated. 
Simulation was also carried out the alternative (1) network model for comparative 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 5, types of fault and fault level model from Stafford switchyard to Stoney 
Drift substation were simulated and presented. Comparative analysis will be 
carried out to make an informed decision. 
 
Chapter 6 further emphasised on BC’s network problems and findings in 
discussions to enable appropriate recommendations.  
 
Chapter 7, Conclusions and recommendations for reliability improvement of 
BCMM’s sub-transmission network will be elaborated and followed by the 
references and appendences.    
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The published literature is to guide the research study and existing literature is 
relevant to the key problem areas in chapter 1. The literature critically review 
sections devoted to each area of research question. Identification and articulation 
of the relationships between literature and field of research, will present all the 
important sense of knowledge that will catalyst solutions. This literature review 
will examine the factors contributing to supply interruptions between 
interconnected substations, and possible solutions. The role of pilot protection 
scheme should play an important role in pursuit of improving system reliability 
will be discussed. The study of literature review will focus on research questions 
as set out in section 1.6 in chapter one.   
        
2.1 Introduction 
In the first part of this chapter, aging infrastructure and concept of power system 
equipment life time will be briefly introduced. In the subsequent sections, we will 
discuss protective relay and reliability of protection systems: dependability and 
security, the failure modes of protection systems, causes of relay non-
responsiveness, and catastrophic failures in power systems. Appropriate 
maintenance strategy (planned preventative maintenance), experienced blackouts 
and cost of reliability will also be presented. This chapter will provide the reader 
with the appropriate theoretical background, understanding the approach in 
evaluating aging infrastructure, relay failures (hidden faults) and reactive 
maintenance which lead to catastrophic failures. Historical works in related areas 
such as security analysis, Markov model, and equipment life cycle optimisation for 
mitigation of power outages will be investigated with the intention of drawing 
conclusions on the significant relationships affecting reliability performance. 
 
2.2 Aging power system infrastructure 
Aging electrical sub-transmission infrastructure is evident in both the developed 
and developing countries around the world. Power system infrastructure aging is 
an undeniable fact in the life of sub-transmission network. Many utilities around 
the world have plants or equipment that have been classified as aged due to their 
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bad performance and increasing failure rate. The failures and outages of these 
equipment are higher than the acceptable level and continue increasing.  
 
“Studies corresponding to the equipment aging of equipment modelling so far have 
focused on transmission system [6-8].  Electrical power systems are formed from 
components such as poles, overhead lines, underground cables, circuit breakers, 
power transformers etc.,. With the passage of time, the more the life of a power 
system, the more its components become aged or old. No repairing and possibly 
lack of accurate timing of replacement of old equipment, overloading and regular 
power outages of the system can be mentioned as reasons of aging the distribution 
system [6]. Figure 2.1 graphically shows the bathtub curve which indicates the 
relationship between fault rate and age of component. As it can be seen in the 
Figure below, this curve includes three stages.  
 
   
Figure 2.1: Bathtub curve: Component failure rate vs age (Adapted from [9]) 
 
The Bathtub curve, Figure 2.1, quantifies the occurrence of equipment failure rate 
through the aging of equipment. The period 0 to T1 is known as the wear-in-period, 
period T1 to T2 is the useful life of the equipment and the time when it is more 
valuable to the user, and T2 is the wear-out period. In Figure 2.2,  
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Figure 2.2: Failure rate vs time for regular maintenance intervals (Adapted from 
[9]) 
 
the failure rate increases with time until the equipment is maintained. After 
maintenance, the failure rate drops to the original value. The dotted line represents 
the average failure rate” [9].    
 
2.2.1 Equipment aging 
“Today, preserving and or enhancing system reliability and reducing operation 
and maintenance cost are top priorities for electric utilities [10]. A utility purchase 
sub-transmission and distribution components such as poles, lines, transformers, 
circuit breakers, switchgears etc., constructing it and put it in to operation leaving 
it in service while tending to it with maintenance and repair as necessary until it 
fails, at which point it is replaced. Power system equipment deteriorates (wear out) 
while in service for a host of causes. These include sustained heating due to current 
flow, insulation degradation due to voltage stress, wear and material fatigue of 
mechanical parts, corrosion from chemicals in the soil, air, and a slow but steady 
deterioration due to the effects of sun, wind, rain, ice and snow. As power system 
equipment continues to age and gradually deteriorates the probability of service 
interruption due to component failure increases” [11].  
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2.2.2 Concept of power system equipment life time 
“Power system equipment performs both technical and economic functions in the 
network. There are three different concepts of the life time of power system 
equipment: 
● Physical life time; A piece of equipment starts to operate from its brand new 
condition to a status in which it can no longer be used in normal operating state 
and must be retired.  Preventative maintenance can prolong its physical life time. 
● Technical life time; A piece of equipment may have to be replaced due to 
technical reason although it may still be physically used.  
● Economic life time; A piece of equipment no longer valuable economically, 
although it still may be usable physically. There are two methods for estimating 
economic life time: 
1. The capital value of any power system equipment each depreciation every year. 
Once the remaining capital approaches zero, the equipment reaches the end of its 
economic life time.   
2. In addition to the depreciating the capital cost of the equipment, operating and 
maintenance are considered. Operating and maintenance (O&M) cost usually 
increases over time as equipment ages and may become excessive. They may even 
exceed the depreciation value of the equipment. It could be cost effective to 
decommission and replace the equipment before its capital value reaches zero 
rather than continue to force high O&M costs” [12].  
 
2.2.3 Reliability issues with aging equipment 
“In developed Countries (North-American and European), the other leading cause 
of increased grid failures is the age of an infrastructure that was built decades ago. 
Circuit breakers are an integral part of this infrastructure. The age and weaknesses 
of such power systems are apparent, especially when it comes to powering 
sophisticated equipment that requires highly reliable supplies. The May 2006 issue 
of IEEE Power & Energy Magazine was titled “The Graying Power System” and 
was entirely devoted to the state and aging problems of electric grids. 
Although investments tend to be cyclic, no massive improvements to the U.S. power 
systems infrastructure have been made since the late 1960s [13]. As a result, the 
vast majority of the grid equipment is now 40 years old or more. Experts note that 
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such a remarkably long service age comes from the robust construction of the 
equipment itself. But ultimately, old equipment wears out. With failure rates that 
abruptly increase with age, old equipment contributes to system unreliability [14]. 
 
The concern for utilities is not the aging of a single device, but the large amount of 
equipment simultaneously reaching an age that is synonymous with high failure 
rates, as graphically shown in Figure 2.3. This phenomenon is known as the 
‘escalation’ of component failure rates. Utilities use this terminology to anticipate 
the potentially overwhelming costs to maintain and to replace old equipment” [15] 
& [16]. 
 
“Circuit breakers, transformers and switchgears are no exception to this 
observation of aging power systems in need for overdue upgrades. The replacement 
of circuit breakers in a single substation already costs millions of dollars. 
Considering the important number of substations in major grids, budget-related 
delays in equipment maintenance and upgrades and the lack of manpower to 
complete these upgrades adversely affect the reliability of power systems. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Illustration of the escalation of component failure rates [17]. 
 
The combination of equipment aging and equipment operation beyond its rated 
current significantly increases the chances of system failures. Safety and 
operational margins are reduced at the same time” [17].  
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2.3 Non-responsiveness of protective devices 
The non-responsiveness of protective devices turn to complicate the whole network 
system and infringe the right of power system to operate successfully. The problem 
could emanate from hidden faults, lack of protection scheme maintenance, human 
intervention (vandalism or theft) etc. Protective devices play a vital role for power 
system to function properly and satisfactorily to meet consumer quality of supply 
expectations. 
    
2.3.1 Introduction 
Electrical power is vital important to our modern society nowadays with its 
associated challenges to provide most efficient and cost effective ways of 
supplying electricity from generation, and transmitted to residential, commercial 
and industrial consumers.. The availability of reliable power supply at reasonable 
cost is crucial for economic growth and development of the country [18]. An 
analysis throughout the world shows that 90% of all customer reliability problems 
are due to the problems in distribution system. Thus, improving reliability on 
distribution system is the key to improving customer reliability satisfaction [19]. 
The concept of power system reliability is extremely important to satisfy customer 
requirements. Figure 2.4 shows the reliability subdivision. [18] 
 
 
 Figure 2.4: Subdivision of system reliability (adapted from [18]) 
Reliability comprises two important elements that are system dependability and 
security of system operation. Dependability is the degree of certainty that a relay 
or relay system will operate correctly, and security on the other hand is the degree 
of certainty that a relay or relay system will not operate incorrectly. In other words, 
dependability means that the relay will operate correctly when a fault occurs, and 
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security on the other hand means that the relay will not operate when there is no 
fault.    
2.3.2 Reliability of protection system  
“Protection systems play a vital role in maintaining the high degree of service 
reliability required in present day power systems. The two primary failure modes 
of a relay are failure to operate and incorrect operation. Relay reliability 
considerations are usually separated into the two different aspects of dependability 
and security [20]. Dependability is defined as the probability that the relaying 
system will operate correctly. In other words, dependability is a measure of the 
relay’s ability to operate when required. Security is defined as the probability that 
a relay will not operate in those situations when tripping is not desired [21]. In 
order to enhance both dependability and security, appropriate testing and 
inspection of the protective system should be performed. Considerable work has 
been done to examine different reliability aspects of protection systems. Reference 
[22] introduces a method to calculate the probability of failure of protective relay 
systems. A reliability index designated as “unreadiness probability” is defined in 
[23] as the probability that the relay system fails to respond when called upon to 
operate in the presence of a fault. The proposed model in [23] has been extended 
and improved in [24] to redefine the unreadiness probability and unavailability of 
a protection system. The improved model recognizes the operation of back-up 
protection, the removal of protection for inspection, the occurrence of common-
cause failures, and the fault clearing phenomena” [20] 
 
“Modern digital relays are normally equipped with self-checking and monitoring 
facilities. The impact on the performance of the relay and the benefits to be 
expected from the use of these facilities are discussed in various papers [25]–[27]. 
Reference [28] illustrates a Markov model to predict the optimum routine test 
interval for a protective relay with and without self-testing capabilities. Two 
different indexes of “abnormal unavailability” and “protection unavailability” are 
defined as the probability that the relay will be out of service while the system is 
energized and the probability that the relay does not respond when a fault occurs. 
An improved reliability model for redundant protective systems is presented in 
[29]. Hidden failures in protection systems and a methodology for identifying them 
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are discussed in [30] and [31]. The failures are considered as the key contributors 
in the degradation of power system wide-area disturbances (blackouts)” [30, 31] 
 
2.3.3 Failure modes of protection system 
Considering the vast number of relays existing on a power system, protection 
systems are highly reliable; however, 100 percent reliability is realistically 
unattainable. Incorrect or unwanted relay operations have occurred in the 2006 
Chiselhurst switch house blackout and the 2008 Progress substation blackout as 
detailed in subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 respectively. 
 
The performance of protection systems can be classified into the categories of 
‘correct operation’, which accounts for relays performing correctly based on the 
input signals, and ‘incorrect operation’, which results from a failure to perform its 
planned functions [32]. In the Correct Operation category, we should be aware of 
‘unwanted operation’, even when the protection system responds correctly to the 
system conditions; this scenario was demonstrated by the Chiselhurst blackout (see 
section 3.6.1). There are two modes of possible improper relaying. The first, failure 
to operate for a legitimate internal fault within the zone of protection relegates 
tripping to backup relaying (Incorrect Operation). The longer the fault clearing 
time, the greater the potential for line or equipment damage as well as system 
instability. “The second mode is false operation for a fault outside of the protected 
zone (undesired tripping). This can cause incorrect isolation of a no-trouble area. 
Undesired tripping could be triggered by a heavy loading condition in the absence 
of a fault or in post-fault conditions, or by miscoordination between primary relays 
and backup relays due to whatever reason, such as current and potential 
transformers, (CT/PT) errors, settings without enough margin, and/or hidden 
failures of relay components. Many utilities have experienced this type of failure. 
 
Different types of relays may have different probabilities of undesired tripping. The 
electromechanical and static protection relays used in transmission systems 
become a major risk as their level of reliability decreases. Even if checked 
periodically, these relays often cause misoperations, leading to cascading outages. 
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The impact of protection system failure depends on the condition of the power 
system when it occurs. Power system operation is greatly affected by these two 
different failure modes, and they have significant effects on the system reliability 
evaluation due to their differences in the number, order, and likelihood of 
contingencies. In either of the above cases, customers and utilities can experience 
problems resulting from misoperations in the sub-transmission system [32]. 
 
2.3.4 Causes of relay misoperation 
“There are four main causes contributing to incorrect operations and they are: 
1) Inappropriate design or application of relay schemes;  
2) Inappropriate settings for some specific system condition; 
3) Human error; and  
4) Component malfunction” [31].  
“Since the first three factors are hard to quantify, they tend to be more related to 
the policy, practice, and the management of individual utilities, and thus are hard 
to control from the point of view of relay engineers; engineers are more interested 
in quantitative analysis of the equipment malfunction. 
The above four categories may not be all-inclusive, but these are the major factors 
involved in the misoperation of a protective system. Other classifications may be 
used by different systems; for example, the WSCC groups the failures of protection 
system into six categories” [32]. Communications, components, settings, design, 
procedures and scheme are as follows: 
1)” Communications: problem with the communications channel, line trap, turning 
equipment, pilot wires etc; 
2) Components: a failure of a part or module of a relay or a component relay; 
3) Settings: inappropriate relay settings, either calculated or applied; 
4) Design: design errors or inappropriate design of circuit; 
5) Procedures: Improper procedures include problems caused by maintenance 
procedures, test and installation procedures; this also includes switching or 
operational procedures; and 
6) Scheme: An inappropriate protection scheme is used” [32]. 
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2.3.5 Reliability modelling of protection systems 
“In this subsection, the general five state reliability model introduced in [33]  
and shown in Figure 2.5 is extended to a 65-state Markov Model to examine 
different reliability aspects of a none-pilot Directional Overcurrent Protection of 
a transmission line shown in Figure 2.6” [33]. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: General reliability model of a protective system (adapted from [33]) 
 
Figure 2.6: Overcurrent system protection of a feeder (adapted from [33]) 
 
2.3.5.1 General reliability model 
“A general reliability model for any protective system can be shown as Figure 2.5. 
In this model, state I represents the state in which a protective system spends most 
of its life, in a healthy and perfect condition, monitoring an operating component 
within its protective zone. This state is designated as “Not Needed & Healthy”. In 
State II, designated as “Needed & Healthy” whose probability is a direct measure 
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of dependability, the system operates correctly in response to abnormal conditions. 
In State III, designated as “Not Needed & Not Healthy”, the system is neither 
required nor ready to operate. It is not required since no fault has occurred on the 
protected component. It is not ready since some part of protective system has either 
failed, under routine test or self-checking inspection. This state can be named 
“Protection Unavailability State”. In State IV, designated as “Needed and Not 
Healthy”, the system does not perform its intended function. In this case a fault 
occurs and no trip signal is sent to the breakers. The probability associated with 
this state is “Abnormal Unavailability”. In State V, designated as “Operation 
When Not Required”, the system operates when it is not required. The more the 
probability associated with this state, the lower is the system security. It should be 
noted that the probability of State II depends mainly on the fault rate and equipment 
restoration time. This simplified model can be expanded for different relaying 
schemes and state probabilities can be determined using the frequency balance 
approach” [34].  
 
2.3.5.2 Detailed reliability model of directional overcurrent protection system 
“To put a step toward expanding the general reliability model, a 23-state Markov 
Model is presented in Figure 2.7 which refers to a more detailed model of a 
protection/component system where the component is a transmission line and the 
protection scheme is based on directional overcurrent logic. Although 23 states are 
shown in Figure 2.7, some of these states consist of several sub-states leading to a 
65-state Markov Model. 
 
The system spends vast majority of its time on state 1 where both protective system 
and the line are perfect and operating successfully. In this condition, protection 
system is ready to respond if it is called upon. In states 2 and 4, a permanent and 
transient fault occurs respectively on the line and the line is isolated by circuit 
breaker operation in states 3 and 5. Isolated line is reenergized in case of transient 
fault. The model transfers from state 1 to 6 when the relay undergoes self-checking. 
State 7 which is composed of 6 sub-states, denotes the conditions in which power 
supply unit (PSU), current transformer (CT), voltage transformer (VT), relay, trip 
coil and circuit breaker is under routine test inspections respectively. State 8 which 
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is composed of 6 sub-states, represents the condition in which protective 
components with the same order as above have failed and the failure is detectable 
by routine test inspections. The model transfers from state 8 to state 10 by detection 
of protective components failures. In this case, the transitions occur to the 
corresponding sub-states of state 10. The relay fails in state 9 and the failure can 
be detected by self-checking function. State 10 is composed of 6 sub-states in which 
the protective components are known to be defective. In states 11 and 12, the relay 
is in potential mal-trip mode and the failure is detectable by routine tests and self-
checking function respectively. The occurrence of an additional failure before 
detecting the potential mal-trip failures will transfer the model from states 11 and 
12 to state 13.1 in which a trip signal is sent to the breaker and isolates the line in 
state 14.1. Breaker inadvertent opening transfers the model from state 1 to 13.2 
and 14.2 in which the line is isolated. In these cases, after isolation of the line, 
reenergizing action can be take place by switching action transferring to states 
10.4 and 10.6, respectively.  
 
State 15 is composed of 6 sub-states denoting the condition in which a fault occurs 
and the protection system is not available to respond to the situation. Depending 
upon which component to be defective, the model moves to corresponding states 
15.1 to 15.6. The system can enter state 15.4 directly from state 1, if a simultaneous 
failure of the relay and the line occurs. The system will enter state 16 by isolating 
the line and additional healthy component X by backup protection system which is 
known to be fully reliable. Depending upon which of the protection system 
components has failed, a transition from states 15.1-15.6 to their corresponding 
states 16.1 to 16.6 will occur. Reconnecting the isolated component X will transfer 
the model to the corresponding states 17.1 to 17.6. States 6-12 represent the failure, 
inspection or repair process of protection system. In these conditions, if a fault 
occurs on the line, the protection system will not be able to send a trip signal to its 
associated breaker and in this case, the model transfers to state 15. While the line 
is isolated and the protection system is UP (state 3), the protection system can fail 
or the routine test inspection of different components can occur. Occurrence of the 
relay potential mal-trip failure in this condition will transfer the model to states 18 
and 20 in which the defect can be detected respectively by self-checking and routine 
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test inspections transferring the system to state 17.4. The only difference between 
state 21 and state 8 is that the line is energized in the latter while it is isolated in 
the former. There is a similar condition between states 23 and 7, 22 and 6, 19 and 
9. The direct transition from state 1 to state 13.1 may occur due to external faults 
in case of erroneous relay coordination or settings. In this case the model transfers 
from state 13.1 to 14.1 isolating the line and then reenergizing by manual switching 
operation getting back to state 1. Human error in performing routine test on the 
relay can transfer the model from state 7.4 to state 13.1. 
Abbreviations used in the model are as following:  
● UP: Operational state; 
● Dn: failed state; 
● Du: Unrevealed failure of protection system 
● Iso: Isolation of the line or neighbouring components 
● Sc: The relay is removed from service for self-checking 
● Rt: One of the protection system components is removed from service for routine 
test inspection” [34]. 
 
Figure 2.7: Detailed reliability model (adapted from [34]) 
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2.4 Power system maintenance  
Electrical power systems begin to deteriorate once they are built or installed. The 
performance and life expectancy of electrical systems begin to decline with 
environmental conditions, such as overload conditions, and excessive duty cycles. 
The principal reason for electrical system failure is failure to maintain (reactive 
maintenance) the dependable designs require preventive maintenance to keep them 
dependable. The power system maintenance is probably the most important 
strategy to mitigate regular fault outages and to sustain reliability performance. 
Maintenance system takes care of life cycle of infrastructure equipment. 
Maintenance revive equipment functionality to reach expected working life. The 
purpose of maintaining equipment is to maintain safe operations and production 
and to reduce or eliminate power system interruptions or equipment breakdown.       
 
 
2.4.1 Optimizing equipment lifecycle 
“There are a variety of issues that must be considered when actively managing 
equipment over its entire lifecycle. Some of the more important include condition 
monitoring, life extension, repair vs replace and optimize lifecycle management. 
a. Condition monitoring: Some prerequisite for a condition monitoring system is 
illustrated in a Figure 2.8 below. 
                                          
Figure 2.8: Links required for decision making by condition monitoring system 
(adapted from [35]).                                           
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                                                       LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 
23 
 
There are three major links in the chain in making a correct and timely decision in 
response to an equipment defect, whether this is incremental such as premature 
insulation degradation or sudden such as a defect threatening plant failure and 
loss of supply [35]. The more a utility can distinguish between the equipment that 
need attention and that which does not, the more it can cut costs while managing 
aging and its effect well. Condition assessment at all level of an electric system is 
challenging. Many utilities are placing much more emphasis on retaining and 
using data on condition assessment and its trends to drive changes in when and 
how they care for equipment. Often these efforts focused on more aggressive 
inspection and testing. Techniques that are becoming more popular include 
infrared inspection; dissolve gas-in-oil analysis, frequency response signatures 
and many others. Online conditioning is also becoming more popular especially 
for substation equipment that can be cost effectively monitor through supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Online techniques range from 
simple alarms (e.g. temperature and pressure) to continuous monitoring of dissolve 
gas-in-oil” [38]. 
 
b. Life extension: “Equipment replacement is often expensive, resource intensive, 
and operationally disruptive. For this reason utilities are increasingly looking at 
life extension strategies as a way to defer replacement. Often an equipment life 
extension program is coupled with a condition monitoring program. When the 
condition of a piece of equipment reaches a certain degree of deterioration, life 
extension options are examined for economic attractiveness” [37]. 
 
c. Repair vs Replace: “Utility practices still vary widely in this area with some 
utilities making explicit repair vs replace decisions. While others only replace 
equipment if it fails or becomes overloaded” [37]. 
 
d. Optimized lifecycle management: “The ultimate goal of a utility is to provide 
reliable electricity for the lowest rates. Inherent in this goal is life cycle cost 
minimization of equipment and the systems they constitute. Ideally the utility 
determines the policies of utilization, operation, inspection, maintenance-repair, 
retirement and replacement in an integrated manner aimed at minimizing total 
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levelized cost. In effect, the utility is optimizing expected life time vs cost. A strategy 
of 'over specify it' (Keep loading low. care it well) will result in equipment that 
lasts long time but might prove expensive to own. A strategy of 'starve it' (cut all 
possible costs out of the initial purchase cost. load it highly. inspect and service it 
infrequently) will result in equipment that cost much less to own but might fail far 
sooner. Somewhere in the middle there is an optimum point for every type of 
equipment and application [37]. This is a simple concept, but making it work is 
only just becoming feasible in power industry. Optimized lifecycle management 
requires good data, effective conditions and remaining life analysis and evaluation, 
sound implementation. In the middle item is a particular challenge for some 
equipment” [37]. 
 
2.4.2 Maintenance philosophy 
“Since a goal of any electric utility company is to supply reliable power to 
customers at low cost, prevention of power system failures is of paramount 
importance during the design and operation of the system. Distribution systems 
have the greatest impact on customer outage frequency and duration. On overhead 
distribution systems, a fault can be classified as temporary or permanent. 
Approximately 75 to 90 percent of the faults are of a temporary nature caused by 
trees, animals, lightning, high winds, flashovers, and so on” [41].  
 
If temporary fault cannot be cleared by the automatic interrupting devices (auto 
recloser), it becomes a permanent fault that will requires attention by a Crew. Some 
of the failures cannot be avoided, such as lightning (surge voltage), storm damage, 
and insulation degradation whereas others can be prevented by proper maintenance 
plans. Maintenance is an important part of the equipment life-cycle, and a carrier 
of power systems pertinent equipment and must be highly considered from the 
design stage throughout the end-of-life stage of the power system. Maintenance 
covers two aspects of systems, operation and performance. Maintenance is 
generally performed in anticipation (preventative) of, or in reaction to, a failure. 
Maintenance is performed to ensure the upkeep of the infrastructure equipment. 
Once the equipment has been purchased maintenance must start. Maintenance is 
defined as the restoration of an item to its original condition or to its working order. 
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“Maintenance is defined in IEEE power engineering society (PES) task force 
report as an activity "wherein failed device has, from time to time, its deterioration 
arrested, reduced or eliminated". This can be achieved by repair, replacement of 
parts or total replacement of the item. The management makes the choice between 
these alternative measures based on practical and economic grounds. The decision 
made at the purchasing will have an input into the type of the maintenance to be 
carried out. In fact the manufactures/suppliers provide the details of regular 
maintenance schedule. This may be rigorously followed for the better performance 
as well as the increasing the life of equipment. Figure 2.9 below shows evolution 
process of maintenance strategies” [40] 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Evaluation of maintenance strategies (adapted from [36]) 
 
2.4.3 Maintenance strategy 
“When the maintenance is being planned, the first decision is to select the 
appropriate maintenance strategy. The maintenance strategies consist of 
operations and means, which are chosen to achieve the set general goals of the 
utility within a general strategic plan. An effective maintenance is not synonym for 
low-cost maintenance. The most important is to see the influence of maintenance 
actions on the process and operation results. For example, in the case of electricity 
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network, the results can be decreased number of outages and shortened outage 
times or better quality of electricity [39]. The maintenance strategy can be divide 
into two classes.  
The first one is corrective maintenance and the second one is the preventive 
maintenance. Corrective maintenance (CM) includes faults occurred in the 
electricity network. Nowadays, well known strategies applied to preventive 
maintenance are time-based maintenance (TBM), condition based maintenance 
(CBM) and reliability centered maintenance (RCM) [37]. A time based 
maintenance strategy features predefined intervals rooted in empirical feedback, 
where components are checked or replaced after a specified period of use. This 
approach generally produces satisfactory results. However, it will not be the most 
cost-effective option in all cases, since the equipment will not usually remain in 
operation up to the end of the possible life time. Condition based maintenance is 
driven by technical condition of the equipment. Under this approach, all major 
parameters are considered in order to determine the technical condition with 
maximized accuracy. For this reason, detailed information via diagnostic methods 
or monitoring systems should be available. The condition based strategy can be 
considered a kind of basic strategy of developed methods. Reliabili1y centered 
methods is a strategy which additionally includes a reliability-based part [36]. Aim 
of this approach is to combine the importance of the equipment in the network and 
the actual condition of the equipment. The selection of maintenance strategy has to 
be made for every component type and in some cases for every component. There 
is not only right solution for certain component, but some guidelines for the 
selection can be given as in Figure 2.10”. 
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Figure 2.10: Selection of maintenance strategy for components or component 
groups (adapted from [36]). 
 
2.5 Prevention and mitigation of blackouts 
A blackout is a result of a chain of accumulated contingencies and system reactions. 
The complete prevention of the power system blackout is almost impossible due to 
the uncertainty in system operation pattern, weather, human factors, etc. However, 
one can expect to mitigate the unfolding event against developing into a large area 
blackout by some carefully designed defensive strategies. Among those strategies, 
the analysis and monitoring tool for relay system operation is the first step since 
the relay misbehaviour may be a very important factor contributing to the blackout. 
Some useful solutions to blackouts are proposed in this literature review [42, 43–
49]. “The relation between the relay hidden failure, relay unresponsiveness and 
power system disturbances is analysed in [42], where the author developed a way 
to calculate the vulnerability index of each relay in the system to indicate which 
group of relays is most likely to cause a problem if and when the hidden failure or 
relay unresponsiveness exists. This should provide information which relay in the 
system should be carefully monitored. The distance protection or line protection 
schemes and their relation to voltage stability and transient stability is also 
analysed in [43], where the author provides an improvement of Zone 3 distance 
protection scheme to enhance the security of the protection relay operation. In 
[44], a wide area back-up protection expert system to prevent cascading outages 
is proposed. The scheme tries to precisely locate the faulted area and avoid 
unnecessary trip due to the relay unresponsiveness, relay hidden failure, or 
overload. Adaptive protection schemes are introduced to properly coordinate the 
relay operations and settings with the prevailing system operating conditions [45–
47]. The power system protection schemes proposing the idea of coordinated 
protection and control means to minimize the impact of a disturbance are discussed 
in” [48, 49]. 
 
2.5.1 Improvements on traditional relay principles 
In this literature review, it is indispensable to study improvements on new relay 
principles that provide enhancement to protection schemes for operational 
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excellence and reliability improvement. “The new protection schemes that are 
considered to be better than the traditional transmission line protection principles 
or distance protection are very extensively studied in this literature review. After 
the digital relay is introduced, the relay principles can be realized using more 
flexible software means [50–53]. New fault diagnosis principles for transmission 
line relay are proposed. The traveling waves based relay schemes, adaptive relay 
schemes, neural network based relay schemes, and transients based relay schemes 
are developed as new directions for transmission line protection” [45–47, 54–68]. 
There are four other types of protection principles which has been introduced to 
salvage transmission line protection which are 1) travelling wave based protection, 
2) adaptive protection, 3) artificial intelligent technique in protection and 4) 
transient based protection.  
1) “The traveling wave based protection for transmission line, which can be used 
for fast fault detection, was introduced in the late 1970s [50–56]. When the fault 
occurs on the transmission line, the traveling waves are generated from the faulted 
point and start moving towards both ends of the transmission line. The traveling 
wave based protection schemes are formed based on detection of the traveling 
wave at line ends. These relays have the advantage of: a) fast response, b) 
directionality, c) not being affected by power swing and CT saturation. However, 
the characteristics of existing widely-used instrument transformers are inadequate 
yet to support this type of protection scheme” [50-60]. 
 
2) “The concept of adaptive protection was introduced during the 1980s [43–45]. 
The concept of adaptive relaying is to make an assessment of the state of the power 
system first, and then automatically make adjustment to protection systems so that 
their settings are suitable for the prevailing conditions. The application areas of 
adaptive relaying could be distance protection and auto-reclosing. The advantages 
of adaptive relaying are: improved system responses, increased reliability and 
reduced costs. However, the basic principles of the various existing relays cannot 
been easily changed to encompass the adaptive techniques” [43-45]. 
 
3) “The application of artificial intelligent techniques in protection attracted re-
searchers since 1990s [57–62]. As an example, neural networks can be used for 
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different applications in transmission line protection including fault detection, fault 
location, distance and direction detection, auto-reclosing, etc. The neural networks 
based protection scheme arranges the voltage and current signal samples as a 
pattern. The fault detection issues then become the pattern recognition issues. The 
advantage of neural network based protection scheme is its “intelligence” to find 
the internal similarity of different types of disturbances. The decision is made by 
measuring the similarity between the unknown patterns and the trained prototypes 
instead of comparing the characteristics of unknown patterns to the fixed relay 
settings. The disadvantage of this system is that one must train the network with a 
large data set, and one must select enough relevant training scenarios to be 
adaptive to the system” [57-62]. 
 
4) “In recent years, the concept of the “Transient Based Protection” is introduced 
by using fault generated high frequency transients to develop new relaying 
principles [63–68]. The technique detects high frequency transient signals through 
specially designed transducers and algorithms, thereby, overcoming the bandwidth 
limitation of conventional transducers. There are a few applications using the fault 
generated transient signals in transmission line protections developed so far. 
Although it is still not proven that this kind of method is reliable when high 
frequency disturbance in the signal is introduced, it is very attractive to explore 
significant improvement in terms of speed and new protection principle” [63-68]. 
 
“Although new protection schemes have been studied for a while, the conventional 
transmission line relays are still widely used in practice today. At the theoretical 
level, the new relay principles must be superior to the traditional relays in order 
to be used as a substitute. At the practical level, the design of the new relay 
principles considers the state-of-art computer and signal processing technology. 
As the digital relays are more widely used, the new relay principles are expected 
to be applied in the future. Although a lot of new techniques proposed in previous 
literature can provide an overall enhancement over the traditional relay, it is still 
hard to find a perfect match due to the algorithm or hardware limits. A combination 
of different techniques might be a better solution to achieve a high performance 
and simplify the real time decision making. The existing network and solutions for 
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preventing cascading blackouts do not propose new relay principles. Most of the 
schemes depend on the improvement of distance relay principles, setting and 
coordination. To solve BC’s problems in preventing cascading blackouts, one can 
suggest some new protection schemes to be installed in the monitoring mode as the 
operation verification tool for existing distance relays. The improved fault analysis 
and load flow analysis results can be utilized to seek a better solution to reduce the 
impact of power interruptions. Currently, this kind of online application has not 
been implemented or even proposed. Most of fault analysis is implemented offline, 
which does not allow understanding the disturbances in real time” [63-68]. 
 
2.6 Cost of reliability 
 A decision concerning adequate levels of reliability and efficient provision 
determines the cost required for quality of supply to customers. In this section we 
discuss the main elements of this decision. We analyse the factors to be considered, 
the trade-offs involved, different alternatives are reported in sub-section 2.6.1. 
Reliability versus cost of interruption is expounded in sub-section 2.6.2. Cost 
effectiveness of reliability improvement in sub-section 2.6.3 and cost benefit 
analysis is reported in sub-section 2.6.4. 
 
2.6.1 Customer interruption cost analysis 
“System customer interruption cost analysis provides the opportunity to 
incorporate cost analysis and quantitative reliability assessment into a common 
structured framework, which can assist the decision making process. The highest 
level of efficiency can only be reached by comparing the increase of performance 
with the required investment costs. The assessment of expected performance 
indicators in respect to supply reliability is the task of the reliability assessment. 
This task can be divided into the calculation of non-monetary interruption indices 
and the calculation of reliability cost/worth indices. The calculation of non-
monetary interruption statistics is more established [69-74]. One possible way to 
accommodate for customer importance is to use the costs for the energy not 
supplied (money/kWh) and/or a cost per interrupted power (money/kW) as an 
adjustable measure for interruption severity. This can produce useful indices, but 
it is often insufficient for more detailed planning or selection of alternatives. This 
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linearization of the costs with the duration of the interruption does not consider the 
fast increase with duration that occurs for individuals as well as for aggregated 
loads [75]. An acceptable method of assessing the worth of power system reliability 
is to evaluate the customer losses due to service interruptions, i.e. the cost of 
unreliability [76]. The basic concept associated with power system reliability 
cost/worth evaluation is shown in Figure 2.11. The total public cost, which is 
ultimately borne by the customers, is the sum of the two curves. The optimum level 
of reliability occurs at the point, i.e. at the point of lowest total cost. Thus customer 
interruption cost (CIC) can be used as an estimate of the worth of reliable electric 
service. The customer survey approach, [75] in which customers are specifically 
contacted, is the most practical and reliable process to obtain these costs. 
Customer interruption costs are a function of both interruption and user 
characteristics. The costs incurred due to power supply interruptions can be 
presented as a function of outage duration, and when expressed in this form is 
known as a customer damage function (CDF). The CDF can be determined for a 
group of Customers belonging to particular standardized industrial classifications 
(S1C). In these cases, the interruption cost vs. duration plots are referred to as an 
individual customer damage functions (ICDF)” [77]. 
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Figure 2.11: The basic concept associated with power system reliability cost/worth 
evaluation (adapted from [76]) 
 
2.6.2 Reliability versus cost 
“The function of a power system is to supply electricity economically and with a 
reasonable assurance of continuity and quality. However, due to the integrated 
nature of power systems, failures in any part of the system can cause service 
disruptions. From the customer standpoint, power disruptions may be experienced 
as frequency and voltage reductions, as unstable supply with erratic frequency and 
power fluctuations or as a total interruption of supply. Although all these events 
impose costs on customers, in practice the effects of supply interruptions are the 
most severe. Ideally, supply should be made continuously available to customers, 
but that is costly and arguably not feasible. In fact, interruptions of supply are 
caused by power outages, which are predominantly events of stochastic nature 
involving the failure of one or several components in the system. Due to the random 
aspect of system failures, it is accepted that any system will present a definite risk 
of suffering a number of future power shortages. That is, unbalances between 
power supply and demand leading to load interruptions. The risk can be reduced 
by installing better equipment or by providing additional capacity as generation 
reserves. The reserve can be dispatched to replace lost generation, effectively 
reducing the probability of load curtailments. 
 
Consequently, in order to lessen the effects of power shortages on customers, it is 
necessary to invest in installed capacity and to incur the operating costs of keeping 
reserves available. As generation reliability is improved, a trade-off occurs 
between the increased costs of capacity reserves and the increased benefits to 
customers, as avoided costs, from fewer power shortages. Therefore, when making 
decisions concerning adequate levels of generation reliability, the factors to 
consider are the incremental costs, the benefits expected and the allocation of 
capital and operating resources among the different parts of the system. The 
objective is to determine an optimal balance between the economic benefits of 
higher reliability and the corresponding costs” [77]. 
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2.6.3 Cost-effectiveness 
“The traditional criterion in systems with centralized decision making has been to 
use least-cost resources in order to meet arbitrary levels of generation reliability. 
This sort of cost-effectiveness criterion implies a priority selection of a reliability 
level, usually based on experience and judgment. Gains realized from higher 
reliability are not considered. However, an increase in reliability may be advisable 
even if it results in a slight increase in cost, and a slight reduction in reliability 
may be acceptable if it results in significant savings. Accordingly, to reach an 
economically efficient outcome, the benefits gained by reliability improvements 
should be assessed against the costs of additional capacity” [77]. 
 
2.6.4 Cost-benefit analysis 
“A better approach compares the incremental cost of reserves with the 
corresponding decline in outage costs, that is, the economic costs incurred by 
consumers because of supply interruptions. The objective is to minimize investment 
and operating plus outage costs over the period considered. The point of minimum 
cost marks the optimal level of reliability to be used as a benchmark in the system. 
The method is illustrated in Figure 2.12. The investment and operating costs can 
be represented by curve RC, function of any suitable reliability index. Outage costs, 
represented by curve OC, decrease as reliability increases. The total cost curve TC 
is the sum of the individual cost curves RC and OC. Total cost presents a minimum 
at R*, which determines the optimal level of reliability” [77]. 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                                                       LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
 
34 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Total reliability costs (adapted from [77]) 
 
“The reliability level R* is treated as a variable and total social cost is minimized. 
This is equivalent to a cost-benefit analysis, which maximizes net social benefit. 
There are two difficulties in applying cost-benefit analysis. First, significant 
problems are found in assessing customer outage costs, and second, outage costs 
need to be related to an appropriate risk index used as measure of system 
reliability. Despite these difficulties, the cost-benefit analysis is a valid economic 
approach, but it is based on centralized decision-making. The cost-benefit 
approach does not incorporate individual choice being hardly compatible with 
competitive electricity markets, where suppliers decide individually the amount of 
capacity to commit” [77]. 
 
2.7 Summary 
The review describe, summarize, evaluate and clarify the literature. It gives a 
theoretical basis for the research and helps to determine the nature of research. The 
aim of this section is to summarise the idea attained from past literature and to bring 
out contributions relevant for this study area. Thus this part starts with the 
knowledge gained in this research study and contribution to BCMM’s reliability 
improvement as follows. 
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2.7.1 Aging infrastructure equipment 
The general knowledge from the past literature is that there is a significant 
relationship between aging infrastructure equipment and reliability that could be 
evaluated with the use of bathtub method to determine failure rate, useful life and 
wear out period of the equipment. Reference [12] stated that as power system 
equipment continues to age and gradually deteriorates the probability of service 
interruption due to component failure increases. Therefore, the upkeep and 
refurbishment of aging equipment abate the failure rate to improve reliability   
 
2.7.2 Non-responsiveness of protective relay 
The significant relationship between non-responsiveness of protective devices and 
reliability is clearly emphasized in the literature review. The theoretical 
understanding is that protective devices are made to be responsive to signals 
received in communication with relative devices to fulfil its role in reliability 
performance. Reference [20, 21] stated clearly that relay reliability considerations 
are usually separated into two different aspects of dependability and security. For 
protective device to be responsive in operation, it must fulfil both requirements of 
dependability and security. Modern technology such as Markov model can 
successfully achieve these requirements to enable protective relay responsiveness 
to meet its reliability obligation. Thus, there is strong relationship between non-
responsiveness and reliability performance. 
                   
2.7.3 Reactive maintenance  
It has been proven that “perceived planned preventative maintenance (PPM) is a 
component of reliability improvement”.  The results of effective PPM can decrease 
the number of outages and shortened outage times, and provide better quality of 
electricity service [7]. It is perceived that, selection of maintenance strategy is vital, 
however, one strategy may not fulfil maintenance needs of all equipment on the 
network.  Thus, the selection of maintenance strategy has to be made for every 
component type. Maintenance optimised equipment life cycle, safe operations, 
increase performance, and to mitigate or eliminate system interruptions and 
equipment breakdown. An analysis throughout the world shows that 90% of all 
customer reliability problems are due to the problems in distribution system. Thus, 
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improving reliability on sub-transmission distribution system is the key to 
improving customer reliability satisfactory [11]. And therefore, choosing relevant 
maintenance strategy is vital for the contribution to customer reliability 
satisfaction.  
 
 The questions that arose from this conclusion ‘is that, is there a significant 
relationship between aging infrastructure equipment and reliability?’ ‘Is there a 
significant relationship between relay failures and reliability? and ‘is there a 
significant relationship between reactive maintenance and reliability? The 
importance of these significant relationships will assist us for reliability 
improvement. 
     
 
2.7.4 Cost of customer reliability 
The cost of customer interruptions is vitally important to be determined on utility 
network. It provides necessary information to determine cost of reliability 
performance. Analysis of customer interruption cost (CIC), customer damage cost 
(CDC), customer damage function (CDF) makes an informed decision to determine 
the cost of customer reliability. The CDF can be determined for a group of 
customers belonging to particular standardized industrial classifications (S1C). In 
these cases, the interruption cost versus duration plots are referred to as an 
individual customer damage functions (ICDF). Cost benefit analysis aims to 
minimize the investment, operating and outage cost for pre-determine period. The 
idea is to minimize the cost to optimal reliability level as a benchmark to be used 
in the network system. This clearly indicates that, reliability cost has significant 
relationship for improvement of power system reliability. 
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Figure 2.13: The relationship between reliability and aging infrastructure, relay 
failures and reactive maintenance for this study. 
 
If the above is agreed that infrastructure equipment life cycle optimization, 
responsiveness of protective relay, planned preventative maintenance and cost of 
reliability are satisfied and give the reasons for satisfaction as reliability 
performance then, conclusion should be drawn that reliability performance has a 
significant relationship with aging infrastructure equipment, non-responsiveness of 
protective relay, reactive maintenance and unreliability can result in lower 
reliability. Based on these significant relationships, the research questions are 
validated on the fact that reliability has a significant relationship with service 
quality essentials which can affect reliability negatively or positively.  
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CHAPTER 3: AN OVERVIEW OF BC’S SUB-TRANSMISSION 
NETWORK 
This chapter provides an assessment based on current state, utility source and 
experienced blackouts, which are selected for review and identifies key topics in 
which more information and theory might be useful as subjects from the literature 
review. It also provides a clear description of the problems experienced and group 
them into categories in order to demonstrate capability in situation analysis. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Electric power systems are often divided conceptually into three main sub-systems:  
generation, transmission and distribution. Transmission systems have the 
responsibility of supplying electric energy to distribution units, where most electric 
consumers are located. Since delivery of electric energy to consumers is the aim of 
electric systems, it is vital importance to focus on the operation of the transmission 
unit. Figure 3.2 shows Buffalo City’s existing sub-transmission network, dating 
back to 1972. Figure 3.1 depicts the area map showing the route length of the 132 
kilovolt (kV) network grid from Stafford switchyard to Stoney Drift and Progress 
substations respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: 132 kV Stafford/Stoney Drift/Progress overhead line route length 
The system connects from Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality’s (BCMM’s) 
point of supply, where power is taken from Eskom and is then transmitted to 
various main substations owned and operated by BC. Numerous incidents have 
occurred in Chiselhurst (adjacent Stoney Drift substation) and Progress substations 
and in each case the entire supply to BC was interrupted.  It is convenient for this 
research to describe the following component of the system as essential 
background to analysing the incidents and the causes of blackouts. 
The intake switching station (Stafford switchyard), which receives supply from the 
adjacent Eskom (Buffalo) substation. Two main BC substations, Stoney Drift and 
Progress are the hubs of the distribution network. The maximum current carrying 
capacity of the line is 500 amps. An Eskom 66 kV line (which serves as redundancy 
supply intake) is a back-up capability to meet the needs of supplying BC. The line 
between Eskom’s Aloe Glen and Buffalo substations is a Bear conductor with 
maximum current carrying capacity of 541 amps. The intake circuit breakers 
protecting these 132 kV and 66 kV transmission systems are situated in Eskom’s 
Buffalo substation. 
 
3.2 Main source of supply 
The bulk power for Buffalo City is transmitted by Eskom from Hydra 400 kV 
substation to Delphi 400 kV substation near Queenstown and to Neptune 400 kV 
substation near East London. Neptune substation has 2 x 500 MVA, 400/132 kV 
transformers. Two 132 kV lines approximately 12 km long, supply Eskom’s 
Buffalo substation.  
Eskom’s Aloe Glen substation is also supplied from Delphi substation near 
Queenstown and has 2 x 80 MVA, 132/66 kV transformers. One 66 kV 
transmission circuit is 12.5 km long, and supplies Eskom’s Buffalo substation. The 
BC’s line between Stafford and Stoney Drift via Progress substations has current 
carrying capacity of 500 amps. The 66 kV transmission line has 541 amps, the 
current carrying capacity available to supply Buffalo City without constraint at 
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Eskom’s Buffalo substation in the event of losing supply on the 132 kV line.  This 
implies that, there is N-2 reliability available in Eskom’s Buffalo substation for BC 
to take advantage of improving reliability.   
            
 
Figure 3.2: Existing BC’s sub-transmission network 
  
3.3 Main equipment 
The power systems main equipment are indispensable for the functionality of the 
sub-transmission system. These equipment ranges from overhead lines, power 
transformers, substations, switchgears etc. It is imperative to take into account the 
reliability of the main equipment of the sub-transmission systems.   
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3.3.1 Overhead lines  
BC’s HV network consists of a double circuit and single circuit 132 kV lattice 
tower lines, emanating from Stafford switchyard and terminating at Stoney Drift 
substation. A tee-off into Progress substation supplies power to the Western part of 
the Metropolitan. Figure 3.3 below shows BC’s sub-transmission HV lines from 
Stafford and Progress tee-off 132 kV feeders. The distance from Stafford to 
Progress tee-off is approximately 3 km. The conductor type of the 132 kV overhead 
line is Wolf conductor. 
 
Figure 3.3: Stafford-Progress tee-off 132 kV feeders. 
3.3.2 Substations and transformers  
Stoney Drift substation is the receiving end from the Stafford switchyard feeders 
via Progress substation. The Progress substation tee-off is between Stafford and 
Stoney Drift, and has 3 x 132/11 kV 20 mega-volt ampere (MVA) transformers 
with neutral earth compensators (NECs) to give a sufficient current for selective 
earth fault protection. The 132/33 kV Stoney Drift substation is one of the main 
distribution centres of the system including the central business district (CBD). 
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This substation consists of 2 x 90 MVA, YNyn0, 132/33 kV transformers with 
NECs to generate a current sufficient for selective earth fault protection on the 
transformers. Stoney Drift also has 3 x 33/11 kV, YNd1 transformers for further 
distribution.  
Table 3.1: Substations and transformers  
No Power Transformer Quantity Voltage Capacity 
1 Stoney Drift substation 2 132/33 kV 90 MVA 
2 Progress substation 3 132/11 kV 20 MVA 
3 Chiselhurst substation 3 33/11 KV 16 MVA 
 
3.3.3 Circuit breakers 
Circuit breakers are mechanical switches and protection devices that electrically 
isolate circuits and components under normal operating conditions, or 
automatically under emergency situations such as sustained faults. The command 
to isolate the circuit is usually provided by protective relays. BC’s sub-transmission 
network utilizes 132 kV oil circuit breakers; two circuit breakers are situated in 
Stafford switchyard, sixteen circuit breakers in Stoney Drift substation and six 
circuit breakers in Progress substation. The main equipment of lines, substations, 
transformers, switchgears (circuit breakers) etc., are elaborated to clarify the main 
system parameters on the BC’s sub-transmission network. The diagram below 
shows the number of main circuit breakers on the sub-transmission network. Figure 
1.1, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.8 clearly indicates the number of circuit breakers in 
the respective substations. Figure 3.4 depicts the Stoney Drift switchyard 
arrangement with sixteen circuit breakers. 
Table 3.2: BC’s sub-transmission circuit breakers  
No Circuit breaker Type Quantity 
1 Stafford switchyard Oil 2 
2 Progress substation Oil 6 
3 Stoney Drift switchyard arrangement Oil 16 
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Figure 3.4: Stoney Drift HV/MV switchyard arrangement with sixteen circuit 
breakers. 
 
3.4 Protection scheme review 
The sub-transmission protection systems are designed to identify the location of 
faults and isolate only the faulted section. The key challenge for transmission line 
protection lies on reliably detecting and isolating any faults compromising the 
security system.  The most essential factors of the protection system must directly 
address dependability and security, the type of communication available, type of 
relays, the age of the system and also its condition. Since Buffalo City’s sub-
transmission network dates back to 1972 (all three circuits), it implies that the 
network’s protection system is equally as old as the transmission network. The 
protection scheme installed on the network is known as a pilot protection scheme. 
Such scheme uses communication channels to send information from the local 
relay terminals to the remote relay terminal, thereby allowing high-speed tripping 
for faults occurring within 100% of the protected line. The pilot wires of the 
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protection scheme have been vandalized therefore, there is no protective relay 
communication between Stafford switchyard and Stoney Drift via Progress 
substations. This scenario might cause protection equipment failures and may 
result in blackouts. The effect of protection systems; relays failures, non-
communication channels, age and condition are expounded in sections 3.6.1 and 
3.6.2 to clarify the role the protection scheme plays in power system reliability. 
The design of operations, the principles of distance protection scheme design, the 
coordination and tuning or setting of relay to give a fast, reliable, sensitive and 
selective protection system is presented in Appendix C.  
 
Figure 3.5: Single line diagram of the existing protection scheme  
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3.5 Network reliability problems 
The main network reliability problem is the total isolation (blackouts) of the sub-
transmission network, including Stafford switchyard (utility source), Stoney Drift 
132/33 kV and Progress 132/11 kV substations. Numerous network problems 
(regular interruptions) occurred over the previous six-year period. The nature of 
many persisting outages is often directly related to network reliability problems. 
The main concerns of the Stafford/Stoney Drift is the unreliability of the network, 
which may be caused by aging infrastructure, an absence of planned preventative 
maintenance and protection relay failures. This chapter provides an overview of 
the unreliability of the power supply, which is unacceptable to consumers who 
expect to pay for reliability particularly commercial and industrial customers. 
Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 highlights the blackout incidents that happened in 
Chiselhurst (adjacent Stoney Drift substation) and Progress. These highlight the 
need for improving reliability of the affected power supply.  
 
3.5.1 Categorisation of problems 
Electrical infrastructure begins to deteriorate once it is built or installed. Systems, 
techniques and methods are to be developed to upkeep equipment life cycle. The 
following description aims to group the problems experienced on BC’s sub-
transmission network in order to analyse the situation. 
 
3.5.1.1 Aging infrastructure     
The aging infrastructure, which comprises of components such as power lines, 
cables, circuit breakers, switches, transformers and protection scheme relays, 
current transformers (CT’s), voltage transformers (VT’s), pilot wires etc., were 
installed in 1972. The performance and life expectancy of the electrical systems 
started to decline due to environmental conditions, such as weather, overload 
conditions, and excessive duty cycles right from their inception. Aging 
infrastructure in BC’s network becomes vulnerable to breakdowns. Due to such 
aging, the down time of restoring electricity supply to customers also increases. 
This scenario affects both system reliability and customer satisfaction. Aging 
infrastructure poses a risk of equipment breakdowns, unsafe switching on and off 
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of the switchgears and regular power outages. This research investigates the 
situation and analyses the best possible way for infrastructure optimisation.  
 
3.5.1.2 Protection relay failures 
Protection schemes exist ‘behind the scene’ for power system to operate effectively 
and reliably. Protection schemes are the control part of electrical power system 
functionality. These schemes comprises component such as CT’s, VT’s, relays, 
communication wires etc. Relays are components that command circuit breakers 
for disconnection of power flowing through the circuit in the event of a fault on the 
electrical network. Relay failures of protection schemes jeopardise power system 
reliability. Therefore, it is imperative for this research study to review the relevant 
literatures in order to analyse these events.   
 
3.5.1.3 Maintenance strategy 
Maintenance of sub-transmission networks is paramount for continuity of supply 
to associated customers. Electrical power infrastructure begin to deteriorate soon 
after its installation. Deterioration causes component deficiency and affects 
performance therefore, it’s imperative to be able to select a relevant maintenance 
strategy to enhance the operational capability of the network systems. Two well-
known maintenance strategies are classified as reactive and preventative 
maintenance respectively; reactive entails failure before maintenance and 
preventative on the other hand entails maintenance before failure. Currently BC is 
utilising the reactive maintenance strategy which, does not provide any 
improvement to the infrastructure life cycle; rather, deterioration steadily continues 
as the infrastructure continues aging. A planned preventative maintenance strategy 
on the other hand optimises the infrastructure life cycle and renders equipment 
available for use. A literature review is imperative, in order to identify a relevant 
strategy in this regard, specific to BC, which is vital to curb this situation.   
 
3.5.1.4 Blackouts 
Blackouts are unplanned and unwanted events that affect all walks of life within 
that particular network supply vicinity. It affects domestic, commercial and 
industrial consumers as well as the city at large. A blackout is the total isolation of 
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the entire sub-transmission network from the intake point of supply due to some 
downstream fault that have been occurred. In 2006, for example, major 
disturbances occurred at the Chiselhurst switch house (adjacent Stoney Drift 
substation) in Buffalo City, specifically the East London area of supply.  Two years 
later in 2008, another blackout happened in Progress substation. These catastrophic 
incidents highlights the need for research to investigate the root cause of such 
problems. Mitigation of the probability of future total supply interruption 
(blackouts) is called for by the community.   
 
3.6 Case study based on experienced blackouts 
Several substantial supply disruptions involving a failure of network services 
occurred in BC during 2006 and 2008. This section reviews the major disturbances 
that have occurred within the past decade in BC, specifically between 2004 and 
2010. These two major events are featured in the following case studies as case 
study 1 and 2 below. 
 
3.6.1 Case study 1 (Blackout of 18th March 2006)  
The largest supply interruption in BC’s history struck at around 11:45 a.m. on 18th 
of March 2006. It affected the entire East London areas of power supply. This event 
had two distinct phases. It began with a combination of failures and system 
operated simultaneous in Chiselhurst switch house between 11:15 a.m. and 11:45 
a.m., which led to the progressive tripping of key 132 kV lines between Stafford 
switchyard and Progress /Stoney Drift substations.   
There are 3 x feeder cables supplying power to Vincent Park suburb namely 
Vincent 1, 2 and 3 feeders respectively. The event began with the Vincent No. 3 
feeder cable which had previously faulted between Chiselhurst and Vincent switch 
houses. The remaining two feeders had to be closed to supply power to Vincent 
switch house. In order to prevent overloading in either of the two feeders to Vincent 
switch house, their circuit breakers were evidently operated simultaneously.  
The simultaneous closure of Vincent No. 1 and Vincent No. 2 circuit breakers at 
the Chiselhurst switch house triggered Vincent No. 1 circuit breaker to develop a 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                          AN OVERVIEW OF BC’S SUB-TRANSMISSION NETWORK  
 
48 
 
fault on the feeder side of the breaker and tripped correctly. The event was 
sustained via the Vincent No. 2 cable as the bus section switch was closed at the 
Vincent switch house. A 30 seconds period during which Vincent No.2 circuit 
breaker in Chiselhurst switch house fail-to-trip, a rattling noise was heard in 
Vincent No. 2 circuit breaker in Chiselhurst switch house. The three switch board 
circuitry exploded that caused major damage to one section of the board including 
relays in the switch house. The second phase of the event occurred as the fault 
escalated into the 33/11 kV switchyard with busbar fault developed after a period 
of about 30 minutes during which 33 kV circuit breakers failed-to-trip. The 
protection systems failure to operate quickly enough and selectively in a presence 
of a fault, the fault escalated to trip the infeed circuit breakers situated in Eskom’s 
Buffalo substation. Figures 3.6a, 3.6b and 3.7 depicts Chiselhurst switch house 
system diagrams (sheet 1& 2) and Vincent Park system diagram respectively.   
 
 
Figure 3.6a: Chiselhurst switch house system diagram (sheet 1) 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                          AN OVERVIEW OF BC’S SUB-TRANSMISSION NETWORK  
 
49 
 
 
Figure 3.6b:  Chiselhurst switch house system diagram (sheet 2) 
    
       
 
Figure 3.7: Vincent Park switch house 
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3.6.1.1 Impact from the outages  
Once the 132 kV circuit breakers tripped, large portions of East London was                   
disconnected. The failure impacted on industrial, commercial and domestic 
customers as well as education systems in the City.   The load lost was estimated 
to be 192 MVA in the East London. The economic cost of the disruption has been 
estimated at between R8 million and R10 million during the outage period. 
Hundreds of working hours lost and manufacturing production was down. The 
blackout caused inconveniences to everyone in the City. 
 
3.6.1.2 Restoration process 
Most services were restored in the areas supplied from Progress substation within 
6 hours, with all services fully restored within forty-eight hours. Restoration 
proceeded in accordance with established contingency with service providers 
(contractors) available on the database. Restoration was greatly assisted by the 
contractors with the ability to energize sub-transmission network from Stafford to 
Stoney Drift and Progress substations. Progress substation formed the basis for 
restoration in the North East part of Buffalo City. Mobile substation was installed 
after the event allowing relatively quick restoration of many suburbs as possible   
and the entire City at large. 
 
                   3.6.2 Case study 2 (Blackout of 11th January 2008) 
East London worst supply disruption in 2 years struck on 11th January 2008 after 
Chiselhurst blackout. The system failure occurred due to the explosion of a current 
transformer (CT) in Progress substation, which triggered the tripping of the 132 kV 
breakers situated in Eskom’s Buffalo substation. The failure of the CT occurred 
about 12:30 p.m. The circumstances surrounding the explosion is summarized as 
follows: 
The event started at around 12:30 p.m. on 11th January 2008, a current transformer 
at the Progress substation in Wilsonia Industrail Park developed an internal fault 
causing it to later explode. This failure triggered a major power disturbance in the 
East London. The 132 kV CT on the blue phase of transformer No. 2 unexpectedly 
exploded. Insulators on the 132 kV line link isolators were extensively damaged, 
the HV surge arrestors on the red, white and blue phases of the 132 kV incomer 
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No. 2 to the substation were also damaged. The 132 kV circuit breaker insulators 
sustained damages to all the three phases and the bushing on white phase of the 
transformer No. 2 were also damaged by flying debris.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: Progress substation: HV arrangement with six circuit breakers 
 
The reasons for the CT explosion cannot be accurately determined, as there is no 
positive evidence as to where or how the fault originated.  No tests can be carried 
out on the CT as it has been totally destroyed. Possible reasons for the fault are 
detailed below: 
● A direct lightning strike on the busbars causing an overvoltage to the system; 
● Possible vandalism (Insulator shot) 
● Low or no oil in the CT, Oil is the insulating medium within the unit. (This  
cannot be determined as the CT was completely destroyed); 
● Water ingress, Moisture ingress usually takes place in the top gasket; 
● Pollution on the CT insulator (This could be anything from a plastic packet to 
dirt on the insulator); and 
● A loose connection on the HV connector to the CT (This cannot be determined 
as the CT was completely destroyed). 
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The No 2 infeed circuit breaker failure ‘to clear the fault’ could be one of the 
following reason; either the circuit breaker was not tripped by the protection relay, 
or the circuit breaker was damaged and could not operate, or the circuit breaker 
operated but did not clear the fault because there was flashover across the breaker 
or on other parts of the substation upstream of the circuit breaker. The fault 
escalated to trip the infeed circuit breakers situated in Eskom’s Buffalo substation 
which results in blackout. The impact and restoration of the Progress substation 
blackout is similar to that of the Chiselhurst switch house. Sections 3.6.1.1 and 
3.6.1.2 elaborates these process in details.  
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 CHAPTER 4: LOAD FLOW STUDY ON BC’S NETWORK 
A planned and effective distribution network is the key to cope with the ever 
increasing demand for domestic, industrial and commercial loads. The load-flow 
study of sub-transmission distribution network is of prime importance for effective 
planning of load transfer. The purpose of this load flow is to analyse and compute 
accurate steady state voltages of all sub-transmission and distribution sections in 
the network. Also it gives the necessary data needed to confidently plan 
improvements to existing network and justify the recommendation of this study.  
 
4.1 Introduction  
This study uses DIgSILENT Power Factory load flow model to pinpoint problems 
in existing sub-transmission network and determine the effects on the reliability 
performance. Load flow analysis (LFA), is the most important tool used in power 
system analysis, design and planning. It is an essential tool, power utilities use for 
planning, operating, efficiency and power exchange. Load flow is also necessary 
for other network situations, for instance, transient stabilities or for contingency 
scenarios.  LFA is essential when determining the capability of a distribution 
network under different network configuration and loading conditions. A typical 
report of the LFA should accommodate the losses of various parts of the network 
such as: infeed power sources whether generated within the network or transformer 
substations; infeed obtained from higher voltage network. This chapter will be 
using DIgSILENT Power Factory simulation of the existing sub-transmission main 
equipment (132/33 kV, 90 MVA, YNyn0 and 132/11 kV, 20 MVA, YNd1 
transformers) and alternative (1) sub-transmission equipment (132/11 kV 40 MVA, 
YNd1and 132/11 kV 20 MVA, YNd1 for Stoney Drift and Progress substations 
respectively). Selection between the two transmission models will inform quality 
decision making.                 
 
4.2 Sub-transmission model  
“DIgSILENT Power Factory is very flexible power system analysis software, and 
it has a very wide range of modelling features in terms of transmission lines. 
DIgSILENT Power Factory provides models from direct current (DC) to 
alternative current (AC) lines over all possible phase technologies (3ph, 2ph and 
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single phase, with/without neutral conductor and ground wires) for both single 
circuit and mutually coupled parallel circuits. Table 4.1 shows an overview of all 
supported options and the corresponding element/type combination. The line 
element, ElmLne, is the most basic branch elements, and it is used to represent the 
model of the overhead transmission lines. The line element can be used to define 
single-circuit lines of any phase technology according to Table 4.1” [78]. 
 
Table 4.1: Overview of line models as available in Power Factory [78] 
System  Phase Technology Element Type 
DC Unipolar Elmlne Typlne 
AC, single circuit 1-ph Elmlne Typlne 
 2-ph Elmlne Typlne 
3-ph Elmlne Typlne, Typlne, 
TypGeo 
1-ph with neutral Elmlne Typlne 
2-ph with neutral Elmlne Typlne 
3-ph with neutral Elmlne Typlne 
AC, mutually 
coupled circuits 
Any combination 
of phase 
technologies 
 
ElmTow 
TypTow, TypGeo  
 
 
For three-phase lines (either single or multiple parallel circuits), the user can 
choose between two different types of models: existing or alternative (1) models.  
 
A transmission line is defined as a short-length line if its length is less than/or 80 
km. In this case, the shunt capacitance effect is negligible and only the resistance 
and inductive reactance are considered, and a model based on existing network 
can be used without any prejudice of the results. The route length of the BC’s 
sub-transmission line network is 10 km and it’s classified as short transmission 
line. In the short line model shown in Figure 4.1, this dissertation assumes the 
shunt capacitance (the legs of the 𝜋) are so small that they are open circuit (i.e. 
neglected). This leaves only the series RL branch. 
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Figure 4.1: Short line model as a “Pi” section with lumped parameters (adapted 
from [79]) 
 
A short line with a load is shown (per phase) in the Figure 4.2. Using circuit 
theory we have:  
                                           (4.1) 
VS VR ZIR        (4.2) 
  
Note that IS = IR. Now, to find the transmission parameters (or ABCD 
parameters) of the short line:  
                
Figure 4.2: Short line with load (adapted from [79]) 
 
For a 2-port model shown in Figure 4.3 as "ABCD" the equations are as follows: 
         (4.3) 
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Figure 4.3: Short line 2-port model (adapted from [79]) 
Comparing with the equations for the short line above, A = 1, B = Z, C = 0 and  
D =1. This completes the equations needed to represent the short line.  
 
        4.3 Existing network simulation  
LFA of the sub-transmission system is conducted using DIgSILENT Power 
Factory version 15.2. It is possible to define any type of fault at any location such 
as the substations, overhead lines or the AC network feeding the substations using 
this software. Therefore, the stability and the reliability of this sub-transmission 
system can be investigated. In order to perform a load flow study, full data is 
collected about the area of study on the network, such as network diagrams, 
transformer parameters and overhead lines, rated values of each main equipment 
etc. Table 4.2 shows data collected on the overhead line of study between 
Stafford/Stoney Drift and Progress substations. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 shows data 
collected on the sub-transmission transformers and tap changers in Progress and 
Stoney Drift. The line data, transformer data and tap changer data required for 
simulation of the network are shown below. 
 
● Line type data (TypLne) 
 
Table 4.2: Line type data for Stafford/Stoney Drift/ Progress line 
Name Rated  
Voltage 
kV 
Rated 
Current 
kA 
Cable/ 
OHL 
R 
(20°C) 
X' RO' XO' B' BO' Cond 
uctor 
 
ACSR 
Single 
Wolf 
132 0.470 OHL 0.208 0.401 0.308 0.501 0.353 0.353 Alu 
mini 
um 
 
 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                                        LOAD FLOW STUDY ON BC’S NETWORK 
  
 
57 
 
● Transformer type data (TypTr2) 
 
Table 4.3: Transformer type data 1 
Name: 132/11 kV 20MVA YNd1 16 Step 5 Nom 
Rated 
Power 
HV Rated 
Volt 
LV Rated 
Volt 
Z  Cu 
losses 
Vector 
Group 
       MVA        kV      kV %   kW   
        20      132    11 15.35   47 YNd1 
       
Tap Side Add.V/tap Phase of 
du 
Neu 
Tap 
Min. 
Tap 
Max. Tap No 
load 
current 
No 
load 
loss 
 
       % Deg    % kW 
   HV 1.25 180 7  1 16 0 0 
         
Tap 
Dependant 
Min Tap 
 
Max Tap 
 
Min 
tap 
Cu  
Max tap 
Cu 
losses 
 
 % % kW kW 
Yes 10.5 8.9 53 39 
 
 
Table 4.4: Transformer type data 2 
Name: 132/33 kV 90MVA YNyn0 15 Step 5 Nom 
Rated 
Power 
HV Rated 
Volt 
LV Rated 
Volt 
Z  Cu 
losses 
Vector 
Group 
       MVA        kV      kV %   kW   
        90      132   33 15.4   47 YNyn0 
         
Tap Side Add.V/tap Phase of 
du 
Neu 
Tap 
Min. 
Tap 
Max. 
Tap 
No load 
current 
No 
load 
loss 
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       % Deg    % kW 
   HV 1.25 180 8  1 15 0 0 
      
Tap 
dependant 
Min Tap 
 
Max Tap 
 
Min 
tap 
Cu  
Max tap 
Cu 
losses 
 
 % % kW kW 
Yes 10.5 8.9 53 39 
 
● Tower geometry type data (TypGeo) 
 
Table 4.5: Tower geometry type dada  
No. 
earth 
wires 
3  
No. line/ 
circuit 
3  
   
 X Y  
Earth 
wire 1 
-4.3 21  
Earth 
wire 2 
4.3 21  
    
 No. 
Phases 
X1 X2 X3 Y1 Y2 Y3 
Circuit 3 3 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.5 2.3 1.85 
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Figure 4.4: Existing network simulation results 
The load flow simulation is depicted in Figure 4.4, the quantities represented are 
the results. The network was simulated at 100% loading. The result is used to 
compare the accuracy of loading between existing and alternative (1) models. 
Figures E.1, E.2 and E.3 in appendix E presents the expanded version of these 
results. The result boxes indicates three parameters presentation namely real power 
(P) in megawatt (MW), reactive power (Q) in megavolt ampere reactive (MVAR) 
and % loading of the component.  Three colour coding indicated in the result boxes 
are “black, orange or yellow and red”, the black colour indicates normal loading at 
80%, the orange or yellow colour present load warning at ≥ 81% and the red colour 
indicates loading at ≥ 100% in a particular set of equipment or line. Figure 3.2 
depicts single line diagram of the existing network model. 
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4.4 Alternative (1) network model 
The alternative (1) focus on Stoney Drift substation where 2 x 90 MVA, YNyn0, 
132/33 kV transformers, 33 kV yard with 3 x 33/11 kV, 16 MVA, YNd1 
transformers and 16 outdoor circuit breakers exist in the same yard (Figure 3.4). 
There are 6 x 33 kV outgoing feeders, 3 x feeders were supplying Arcadia 
substation which is now supplied from another 132 kV substation called Queens 
Park. The remaining 3 x 33 kV feeders supply Philip Frame 33/11 kV, 20 MVA 
YNd1 transformers in close proximity to the 33 kV yard. This dissertation proposes 
two alternative models namely alternative (1) and alternative (2) to select 
appropriate alternative for making an informed decision to salvage the lower 
reliability performance. There are vital reasons for alternatives to be considered: 
● The yard arrangement is complicated for load transfer; 
● Arcadia substation is no longer supplied from Stoney Drift substation; 
● BCMM’s network distribution system supply 11 kV medium voltage (MV) 
throughout its entire distribution spheres; 
● The existing Stoney Drift 33 kV switch yard consist of 16 circuit breakers (refer 
to Figure 3.4); 
● The circuit breakers in the 33 kV yard are older than 35 years in service; 
● The 2 x 90 MVA, YNyn0, 132/33 kV transformers are badly leaking oil; and 
● There are no circuit breakers for incoming feeders only isolator links and surge 
arrestors.       
The alternative (1)  seeks to decommission (eradicate) Stoney Drift 33 kV yard 
arrangement as shown in Figure 3.4 and replace with 3 x 40 MVA, YNd1, 132/11 
kV transformers as shown in Figure 4.6. The alternative (1) network project further 
consider refurbishing the lines between Stafford and Stoney Drift for the 
installation of 132 kV circuit breakers for outgoing and incoming feeders 
respectively.  The project also includes replacement of pilot protection wires with 
optic fibre communication technology. 
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Figure 4.5: Alternative (1) network simulation results 
 
Figures E.4, E.5 and E.6 expanded Figure 4.5 in appendix E for clear identification 
of the figures in the result boxes.   
 
Table 4.6: Colour legend 
NO COLOUR PERCENTAGE LOADING 
1 Black   
 
Normal loading at 80% 
2 Yellow or Orange  
 
Loading at ≥ 81% 
3 Blue  
 
Loading at 95% 
4 Red  
 
Loading at ≥ 100% 
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Figure 4.6: Single line diagram of alternative (1) network model 
 
4.5 Alternative (2) network model  
In this section, BCMM’s sub-transmission network will be modelled as alternative 
(2) with standard range of equipment (132/11 kV, 40 MVA, YNd1) in both Stoney 
Drift and Progress substations. The plan aims to account for the alternative 
replacement of the existing infrastructure where the condition of equipment 
requires such on the sub-transmission for reliability improvement. The study 
assessed the condition of the entire sub-transmission substations and of the key 
overhead lines to make decision. The assessment was limited to a visual inspection 
of HV lines and substation equipment. The primary purpose was to determine what 
electrical infrastructure should be replaced, uprating or upgraded as part of this 
research study. The condition so determined was kept in mind when considering 
future development plans. The assessment was split in the following manner:  HV 
power transformers (in substations); and HV overhead lines between Stafford and 
Stoney Drift. 
● Power transformers 
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Table 3.1 depicts power transformers on the sub-transmission network system. The 
recommendation to replace power transformers has been based primarily on the 
age of the units and their expected design life.  
 
Table 4.7: Transformers older than 35 years 
Transformers Stoney Drift/Chiselhurst Progress 
90 MVA, YNyn0, 132/33 kV 2  
20 MVA, YNd1, 132/11 kV  3 
16 MVA, YNd1, 33/11 3  
Total 5 3 
 
The existing design in Stoney Drift switchyard is complicated. There are 2 x 90 
MVA,   YNyn0, 132/33 kV and 3 x 16 MVA, YNd1, 33/11 kV transformers in the 
same switchyard. BCMM distributes 11 kV on their distribution hubs of the 
network therefore, it is imperative to replace the 2 x 90 MVA, YNyn0, 132/33 kV 
transformers at Stoney Drift substation and replace with 3 x 40 MVA, YNd1, 
132/11 kV transformer units. With that, the 3 x 33/11 kV, 16 MVA, YNd1 
transformers can also be removed. Transformers nearing the end of their life span 
will be of particular interest to BCMM. Transformer loading over particular period 
affects transformer life span. Table 4.7 depicts transformer age based on the 
installation date. A single line diagram of Stoney Drift alternative (2) upgrade is 
shown as Figure 4.7 below. 
 
Figure 4.7: Alternative (2) Stoney Drift substation single line diagram. 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                                        LOAD FLOW STUDY ON BC’S NETWORK 
  
 
64 
 
Progress substation is currently e quipped with 3 x 20 MVA, YNd1, 132/11 kV 
transformers. The alternative (2) will upgrade the substation with 3 x 40 MVA, 
132/11 kV, YNd1 transformers. It is imperative that all the transformers installed 
be of the same vector group so as to allow back-feeding when required. The 
existing transformer plinth can be extended should this be required to 
accommodate the 40 MVA transformers. A single line diagram for the alternative 
(2) Progress substation is shown as Figure 4.8 below. 
 
 
Figure 4.8:  Alternative (2) Progress substation upgrade single line diagram 
  
Given the high cost of HV power transformers and associated lead time to motivate 
and secure the necessary replacement budgets, and the time to procure and install 
new transformers, it would be advisable for the BCMM to continue oil sampling, 
purification and analysis on a regular basis in order to adjust the timing of 
replacements recommended in this dissertation. 
 
● HV overhead lines 
The existing outgoing feeders from Stafford switchyard to Stoney Drift do not have 
HV circuit breakers. The HV incoming lines at Stoney Drift substation also do not 
have HV circuit breakers, only line isolators, CT’s and surge arresters are provided. 
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It is imperative that these lines be afforded circuit breakers. A fault on the future 
132/11 kV transformers would result in the BCMM’s breaker at Eskom’s Buffalo 
substation tripping. Thus, the proposed installation of 132 kV circuit breakers at 
Stoney Drift would allow better network reliability performance. The introduction 
of 132 kV circuit breakers at Stoney Drift allows for easy load transfer and 
maintenance i.e. one line can be removed from service to allow for maintenance on 
the other line. A tubular busbar can be installed should space be a problem. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Alternative (2) proposed sub-transmission network configured model 
 
4.6 Comparative analysis between existing and alternative (1) network models 
The BCMM’s existing power system is well known as Stafford/Stoney 
Drift/Progress transmission line and the main equipment data is referred to 
subsection 2.3. This power system consist of 3 main busbars namely Stafford 
switchyard, Stoney Drift and Progress busbars and 3 circuits of 9 lines. The existing 
network consist of 2 x 90 MVA, YNyn0, 132/33 kV transformers, 33 kV busbar 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                                        LOAD FLOW STUDY ON BC’S NETWORK 
  
 
66 
 
yard and 33/11 kV,  3 x 16 MVA, YNd1 transformers at Stoney Drift substation, 
and 3 x 20 MVA, 132/11 kV,  YNd1 transformers at Progress substation and system 
frequency is 50 Hz.  
 
 The existing network model unfortunately offers many disadvantages such as: 
● Outgoing and incoming feeders from Stafford switchyard to Stoney Drift do not 
have HV circuit breakers; 
● All HV transformers are older than 35 years with reference to Table 4.7; 
● Regular unplanned power interruption is eminent; 
● Planned preventative maintenance not available; 
● Operational difficulties in load transfer; 
● Aging infrastructure equipment is eminent; 
● The network configuration does not allow planned preventative maintenance to 
be carried out; and  
● Reliability performance is low.    
 
For the purposes of comparison, two (existing and alternative (1)) scenarios are 
created where all transmission lines are simulated using the same model and with 
100% loading with the same software. The comparison of results is defined as 
relatively how well balanced network loading scenario emanate. The results of both 
network models are clearly (visual enhancement) presented as percentages as well 
as colour coding in Figure 4.5 as well as Figures E.1, E.2, E.3,E.4, E.5 and E.6 in 
appendix E.  Colour legend is set in order to help identify changes. The colour 
legend is shown as Table 4.6.  
 
The results show the changes are related in magnitude and percentage loading of 
the bus voltages. The use of alternative (1) network model shows voltage flow can 
be known, and the lines should not be overloaded.   
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The results show the significant changes in loading at the bus voltages with the 
alternative (1) model. Even though both network simulation were carried out at 
100% loading, there is significant changes in loading from Red to Black between 
Stafford and tee-off, as well as from Red to Orange between Eskom’s Buffalo and 
Stafford. The use of alternative (1) network model offers several advantages such 
as: 
● It is easy to be implemented and requires low civil works; 
● It offers safe load transfers (switching); 
● It gives opportunity for service personnel to carry out planned preventative 
maintenance to upkeep aging equipment; 
● It makes circuit breakers available on outgoing feeders from Stafford and 
incoming feeders to Stoney Drift; 
● Pilot protection scheme will be restored;  
● It will decrease unexpected downtime;  
● Pilot protection scheme functionality restored; 
● Protective relays will be responsive to faults; 
● New equipment will strengthening the network system; 
● Reduce operating and maintenance costs;  
● Get more capacity out of existing assets; and 
● System transmission loss minimizes. 
 
 However, this simple and easy model has few disadvantages: 
● Budget must be raised for new transformers; 
● New 132 kV circuit breakers need to be purchased; and 
● Construction of new transformer plinths. 
 
4.7 Cost effectiveness of alternatives (1) and (2) 
The better approach compares the cost of alternative (1) network with the 
corresponding alternative (2) network models. The criterion in systems decision 
making has been to use least-cost resources and to meet the required level of 
reliability performance required. The objective is to minimize investment, 
operating and outage costs over the period considered. The point of minimization 
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cost marks the optimal level of reliability to be used as a benchmark in the system. 
The alternative network model focus on decommissioning 2 x 90 MVA, YNyn0, 
132/33 kV and 3 x 16 MVA, 33/11 kV, YNd1 transformers in Stoney Drift 
substation and commission 3 x 40 MVA, 132/11 kV, YNd1 transformers. The cost 
estimated for the completion of this project is R8.48m. Alternative (2) network 
model considers decommissioning 3 x 20 MVA, 132/11 kV, YNd1 transformers in 
Progress substation and replace it with 3 x 40 MVA, 132/11 kV, YNd1 
transformers as well as decommissioning equipment in Stoney Drift substation as 
mentioned above and replace with 3 x 40 MVA, 132/11 kV, YNd1 transformers.  
 
Table 4.8: Provisional cost estimates 
No. Substation Name Cost 
1 Stoney Drift substation R8.48m 
2 Progress substation R8.48m 
 
The estimated cost for completion of this project is twice as the alternative (1) 
network model project at R16.96m. With reference to subsection 2.6.3, this sort of 
cost-effectiveness criterion implies a priority selection of a reliability level, usually 
based on experience and judgment. However, an increase in reliability may be 
advisable even if it results in a slight increase in cost, and a slight reduction in high 
reliability may be acceptable if it results in significant savings. Accordingly, to 
reach an economically efficient outcome, the benefits gained by reliability 
improvements should be assessed against the costs of additional capacity. This 
clearly implies that, the alternative (2) network model is expensive for interim 
implementation. Perhaps it may be considered as a long-term plan for future 
implementation in accordance with the city population growth. Therefore, the 
alternative (1) network model is selected due to its cost-effectiveness which can 
also be considered as a short-term solution to the BCMM’s reliability problems. 
The alternative (1) network model will reduce loading pressure on sub-
transmission line and equipment to improve reliability. The alternative (1) model 
provides better network loading to curb overloading problems.   
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  CHAPTER 5: FAULT LEVEL STUDY ON BC’S NETWORK 
The fault level at any given point of electric power supply network is the maximum 
current that would flow in case of a short circuit fault at that point. In normal power 
systems operating conditions, current will flow through all elements of the 
electrical power system within predetermine values which are appropriate to these 
elements’ ratings. Power system can be analysed by calculating the system voltages 
and currents under normal and abnormal scenarios [80]. The purpose of fault level 
calculations are for: 
● Selecting short circuit protective devices of adequate short circuit breaking    
capacity; 
● Selecting circuit breakers and switches of adequate short circuit making capacity; 
● Selecting busbars, busbar supports, cables and switchgear designed to withstand 
thermal and mechanical stresses because of short circuit; and 
● To do current based discrimination between circuit breakers. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Faults usually occur in a power system due to either insulation failure (insulation 
deterioration) results in a flashover, physical damage by human error (during 
construction or vandalism etc.).  These faults, may either be three phase in nature 
involving all three phases in a symmetrical manner, or may be asymmetrical where 
usually only one or two phases may be involved.  These faults may also be caused 
by either short-circuits to earth or between live conductors, or may be caused by 
broken conductors in one or more phases results in open circuit fault.  Sometimes 
simultaneous faults may occur involving both short-circuit and open conductor 
faults (also known as open-circuit faults). These are also known as shunt and series 
faults respectively.  
 
5.2 Types of faults  
The analysis of faults leads to appropriate protection settings which can be 
computed in order to select suitable fuse and circuit breaker size, and type of relay 
[80]. The severity of the fault depends on the short-circuit location, the path taken 
by fault current, system impedance and its voltage level. In order to maintain the 
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continuation of power supply to all customers which is the core purpose of the 
power system’s existence, all faulted parts must be isolated from the system 
temporarily by the protection schemes. When a fault exists within the relay 
protection zone at any transmission line, a signal will be sent to trip or open the 
circuit breaker isolating the faulted line. To complete this task successfully, fault 
analysis has to be conducted in every location assuming several fault conditions. 
The goal is to determine the optimum protection scheme by determining the fault 
currents & voltages. In reality, power system can consist of thousands of buses 
which complicate the task of calculating these parameters without the use of 
computer software such as DIgSILENT Power Factory. 
 
There are two types of faults which can occur on any transmission line; balanced 
and unbalanced faults or symmetrical and unsymmetrical faults. Unbalanced faults 
can be classified into single line-to-ground fault, double line fault and double line-
to-ground fault. Balanced fault is also classified as three phase fault. 
 
5.2.1 Three phase fault  
“By definition a three-phase fault is a symmetrical fault. Even though it is the least 
frequent fault occur in power system network, it is the most dangerous fault. Some 
of the characteristics of a three-phase fault are a very large fault current and 
usually a voltage level equals to zero at the site where the fault takes place. A 
general representation of a balanced three-phase fault is shown in Figure 5.1 
where F is the fault point with impedances Zf and Zg.  In reality, this type of fault 
does not often exists which can be seen from its share of 5% of all transmission 
line faults” [81].  
 
Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 shown below indicates the types of fault to be 
considered in the power system planning stage which could cause disturbances on 
the power systems network including three phase fault, single line-to-ground fault, 
line-to-line fault, and double line-to-ground fault respectively.  
 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY 
                                                        FAULT LEVEL STUDY ON BC’S NETWORK 
  
 
71 
 
   
Figure 5.1: General representation of a balanced three-phase fault (adapted from 
[81]) 
 
5.2.2 Single line-to-ground fault  
“The single line-to-ground fault is usually referred as “short circuit” fault and 
occurs when one conductor falls to ground or makes contact with the neutral wire. 
The general representation of a single line-to-ground fault is shown in Figure 5.2 
where F is the fault point with impedances Zf. Phase a is usually assumed to be the 
faulted phase, this is for simplicity in the fault analysis calculations” [82]. 
   
   
Figure 5.2: General representation of a single line-to-ground fault (adapted from 
[82]). 
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“Line-to-ground fault: this type of fault exists when one phase of any transmission 
lines establishes a connection with the ground either by ice, wind, falling tree or 
any other incident and it count for 70% of all transmission line faults are classified 
under this category” [82]. 
 
5.2.3 Line-to-line fault  
“A line-to-line fault may take place either on an overhead and/or underground 
transmission system. It occurs when two conductors are short-circuited. One of the 
characteristic of this type of fault is that its fault impedance magnitude could vary 
over a wide range making very hard to predict its upper and lower limits. It is when 
the fault impedance is zero that the highest asymmetry at the line-to-line fault. The 
general representation of a line-to-line fault is shown in Figure 5.3 where F is the 
fault point with impedances Zf. Phase b and c are usually assumed to be the faulted 
phases; this is for simplicity in the fault analysis calculations” [81]. 
 
   
Figure 5.3:.General representation of a line-to-line fault (adapted from [81]) 
 
“Line-to-line fault: It happened as a result of high winds, one phase could touch 
anther phase and line-to-line fault takes place and it count for 15% of all 
transmission lines faults are considered line-to-line faults” [81]. 
 
5.2.4 Double line-to-ground fault  
“A double line-to-ground fault represents a serious event that causes a significant 
asymmetry in a three-phase symmetrical system and it may spread into a three-
phase fault when not clear in appropriate time. The major problem when analysing 
this type of fault is the assumption of the fault impedance Zf , and the value of the 
impedance towards the ground Zg” [81]. “The general representation of a double 
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line-to-ground fault is shown in Figure 5.4 where F is the fault point with 
impedances Zf and the impedance from line to ground Zg. Phase b and c are 
assumed to be the faulted phases, this is for simplicity in the fault analysis 
calculation”. [82]. 
 
   
Figure 5.4: General representation of a double line-to-ground fault (adapted from 
[82]) 
 
 “Double line-to-ground: two phases will be involved instead of one at the line-to-
ground faults scenarios and it also count for 10% of all transmission lines faults 
are under this type of fault” [82].   
 
5.3 Comparison of existing and Alternative (1) fault level simulation 
Since symmetrical components method includes many matrix operations and 
computer can be utilized to perform fault analysis in well-organized, effective, 
faster and logical means. In addition, the data can be used to accomplish this task 
where existing and alternative (1) network models are simulated. DIgSILENT 
Power Factory was selected as the simulation tool in this dissertation due to several 
reasons. Our background of DIgSILENT Power Factory (used for load flow 
analysis) was the main reason behind this choice. In addition, any data can be edited 
and modified easily to handle any future cases using the command edit window. 
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Also, DIgSILENT Power Factory contains many built-in functions to resolve 
different electrical problems. DIgSILENT Power Factory software program has 
been applied through every selected substation to determine 3 phase and single 
short circuit current levels. Fault current is a function of the total system impedance 
and the available voltage.  
 
5.4 Existing network fault level simulation 
The simulation results of the existing network model indicates existence of (21 kA, 
and 14.4 kA) 3 phase and (8.16 kA and 18.3 kA) 1 phase fault levels for Progress 
and Stoney Drift respectively. The existing network experiences regular unplanned 
power interruptions including blackouts in 2006 and 2008. Aging infrastructure 
equipment increases probability of fault to occur on the network. No relay 
communication due to unavailability of the pilot wires. Fault on the existing 
network is unpredictable. Fault occurred at downstream of the network escalates to 
tripping the infeed circuit breakers (no proper fault segregation). Due to aging 
equipment, reactive maintenance, non-responsiveness of protective devices, 
reliability level is low.  BC’s existing network manual fault level calculations is 
presented in appendix F. 
 
5.5 Alternative (1) network fault level simulation 
Alternative (1) network simulation carried out indicates (7.4 kA and 6.3 kA) 3 
phase and (11.6 kA and 10.2 kA) 1 phase fault levels at Progress and Stoney Drift 
substations respectively. With reference to subsection 4.4, the alternative (1) 
network model will be strengthened with replacement of new equipment which 
provides adequate information to calculate relevant impedances. Impedance play 
an important role in determining network fault levels. With reference to subsection 
4.6 paragraph 4 elaborate the advantages of alternative (1) network model.   
 
5.6 Fault level comparative analysis 
Faults in the AC sub-transmission are divided into two categories namely 3 phase 
and single phase faults. The first is the fault when feeding through the transmission 
line and depending on the fault type and duration can cause poor reliability 
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performance of the network. Three phase faults in the transmission lines feeding 
the substations have the worst effect resulting on power transformers to cause 
unplanned interruption. However, considering single phase or two phase faults, 
lower power can be fed to substations and the rest of the power demand can be 
gained from adjacent trunk feeders or substations, therefore, not all customers will 
experience power interruption. Table 5.1 shows comparative 3 phase and single 
phase fault levels in BCMM’s sub-transmission’s respective busbars. The results 
of the existing and alternative (1) network model simulation with DIgSILENT 
Power Factory is depicts in Table 5.1. Comparatively, the results are totally 
different at Progress and Stoney Drift bus with exception of the fault level in 
Stafford switchyard.  It is important to compare between existing and alternative 
(1) model in order to make accurate fault level analysis. Considering the severity 
of faults, this dissertation compares 3 phase and a single phase fault levels,  
A lower fault level on the network will have detrimental effect on the protection 
system co-ordination. A medium fault level results is preferable, the protection 
systems functions precisely to achieve system reliability. A higher fault level in 
an interconnected power system network will lead to selection of higher current 
rating equipment and that have an impact on the older network equipment 
negatively.  
 
Table 5.1: Comparative fault level analysis 
Fault level  
at Bus 
Existing network model 
Simulation result in kA 
Proposed network 
model simulation result  
in KA 
3 Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 1 Phase 
Stafford 
switchyard 
11.2 13.3 11.2 13.3 
Progress 
substation 
21 8.16 7.4 11.6 
Stoney Drift 
substation 
14.4 18.3 6.3 10.2 
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Fault level comparative analysis shows alternative (1) network simulation has a 
reasonably medium fault level at the respective busbars. Interestingly, it is 
acknowledged that both network have the same fault levels at the supply source. 
This is due to the fact that, the source impedance is the same in both network 
models. The network system impedance has significant effect in determining fault 
level at the bus. Network configuration also have important role to play with 
regard to determining a fault level on a network. Therefore, it is imperative to 
consider using alternative (1) network model for implementation in reliability 
improvement.    
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSIONS 
The discussions of reliability improvement on BCCM’s electricity network is 
indispensable. In this section, the eminent problems and conditions where 
improvement is valid is discussed. The improvement is based on aging 
infrastructure, protection scheme, maintenance practice, load flow and fault level 
of the BCMM’s sub-transmission network. 
 
6.1 Aging infrastructure equipment  
 Infrastructure aging of power system is of great concern in the BCMM’S 
electricity network. For example, Table 4.7 elaborate on the aging transformers 
which are older than 35 years. These 3 x 20 MVA, 132/11 kV, YNd1 and 2 x 90 
MVA, 132/33 kV, YNyn0 transformers are situated in the main distribution hubs 
of Progress and Stoney Drift substations respectively. Buffalo City’s existing sub-
transmission network, dating back to 1972. The relative equipment are now 44 
years in service, including overhead line from Stafford switchyard to 
Progress/Stoney Drift, transformers and circuit breakers. No repairing and possibly 
lack of accurate timing of replacement of old equipment, overloading and regular 
power outages of the system can be mentioned as reasons of aging the sub-
transmission system [6]. 
● Overhead lines: Major factor that causes conductor aging is annealing which due 
to high line temperature. Annealing is the process where the tensile strength of a 
copper or aluminium conductor is reduced at the sustained high temperatures. 
Although the conductor strength is reduced gradually, the reduction due to 
conductor aging, which is accumulated over time is increasing the probability of 
blackouts. Furthermore, the current-carrying capacity of an overhead line 
conductor is often determined by the loss of its tensile strength as a result of 
cumulative annealing during its planned lifetime or aging. Aging overhead 
conductor experience hotspots, sags and weak terminations. 
● Transformer: The aging transformers can be identified with overheating, reduced 
oil insulation property, regular temperature alarm going off, oil leaks at the 
bushing, load losses etc. It further requires top oil temperature rise over ambient at 
rated load, bottom oil temperature rise over ambient at rated load. Aging 
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transformer with aging oil causes deterioration, such as ingress of moisture, ingress 
of air and oversaturation of gas.  
● Circuit breakers: Aging circuit breakers experienced with main problems namely 
mechanical faults with drive mechanism, contact erosion and leakage. Since 
BCMM’s Progress and Stoney Drift substations are outdoors, heating can be 
exacerbated for equipment by solar radiation. It can be identified with compound 
leakage chambers, gasket joints for leakage and corrosion. 
         
6.2 Reactive maintenance 
When a piece of equipment is aging and can no longer be used in normal operating 
state and must be retired, maintenance can prolong its physical life time.  However, 
practicing reactive maintenance may not prolong the physical life time rather the 
network will be experiencing unpredictability, equipment not maximised and 
indirect costs. 
● Unpredictability: one of the main disadvantages of reactive maintenance is 
unpredictability of when faults may occur. This lack of knowing and preparation 
may well result in either labour or materials being unavailable immediately and 
therefore delay the time taken for a repair and increasing equipment downtime.  
● Equipment not maximised: Reactive maintenance doesn’t protect or look after 
equipment and therefore reduces the life span of the equipment. Rather than 
preserve the equipment and ensure its functionality in optimum condition, reactive 
maintenance approach does the bear minimum to keep equipment operational. The 
negative effect of this is that the equipment won’t fulfil its potential or return on 
investment. 
● Indirect costs: Further indirect costs are found with reactive maintenance with 
equipment downtime or unreliable equipment causing negative effects on 
reputations, safety and the ability to run the network effectively and productively. 
Furthermore, hiring contractors for an assistance in time of emergencies is costive 
exercise.  
 
6.3 Non-responsiveness of protective devices  
The case study 1, elaborates how protection system fail to operate quickly enough 
and selectively in a presence of a fault, and how the fault escalated to trip infeed 
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circuit breakers situated in Eskom’s Buffalo substation. With the case study 2, 
though, the cause of blackout is unclear however, many options are elaborated to 
substantiate the possible cause of the accident. These are some possible causes, 
circuit breaker’s failure ‘to clear the fault’ could be; either the circuit breaker was 
not tripped by the protection relay, or the circuit breaker was damaged and could 
not operate, or the circuit breaker operated but did not clear the fault because there 
was flashover across the breaker or on other parts of the substation upstream of the 
circuit breaker. Nonexistence of pilot wires was identified between Stafford and 
Progress/Stoney Drift substations. Furthermore, no circuit breakers installed at the 
outgoing Stafford feeders and receiving end feeders at Stoney Drift substation for 
relay co-ordination.     
 
6.4 Load flow analysis 
Load flow: The conditions of validity of load flow analysis are given in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4 clearly shows the validity of component being overloaded including 
transmission lines and busbars.  The load flow result shows existing network is 
overloaded from Eskom’s source of supply to Stafford switchyard, another line 
from Stafford to Stoney Drift is overloaded and all three feeders to Progress 
substations are also overloaded 
 
6.5 Fault level analysis 
Fault levels of power system cannot be over emphasized. Fault contribute 
immensely to power systems interruption. Both dependability and security can be 
negatively affected if fault levels on the network are incorrect (either high or low 
fault level). Correct protective relay settings, co-ordinations and operations will 
depend upon correct and precise determination of fault levels at the relevant 
busbars on the network.  For instance, a bolted phase to ground fault will 
necessarily have a lower fault current than a bolted phase-phase fault because the 
phase-to-ground voltage is inherently higher. However, a high-impedance phase-
to-phase fault could certainly have a lower current than a bolted phase-to-ground 
fault. Line-to-ground and 3 phase faults: For a line to ground fault, the fault 
current is the highest as compared to other fault conditions given the same value 
of fault impedance. Often the thinking is that a 3 phase fault is the most severe so 
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it will have the highest fault current which of course is not the case. Fault current 
is the highest in a line-to-ground fault but 3 phase faults are more severe because 
of other repercussions that they have on the generator such as electrical power 
output becoming zero. Another typically example happens close to a transformer 
where the zero sequence impedance is low or zero. However as you move further 
from the transformer, the zero sequence impedance grows higher than the positive 
sequence as you move away from the transformer. Regular power interruptions 
eminent on BCMM’s sub-transmission network is discussed. 
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                      CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
Dissertation for improving Buffalo City’s sub-transmission reliability under 
University of Cape Town for academic requirement has been presented. The 
approach to completing the dissertation is outline as follows: 
● Data collection and verification: Review of all technical data provided for this 
study including the previous outage data, network information and drawings. This 
task included various site meetings, staff interviews and site inspections.  
● BCMM’s sub-transmission overview: The supply intake, Eskom’s Buffalo 
substation and Buffalo City’s Stafford switchyard arrangement showing 2 x 132 
kV circuits to Stafford with 2 x 132 kV circuit breakers has been presented. The 
supply intake re-configuration to make 3 x outgoing 132 kV lines (circuits), in 
order to supply Stoney Drift and Progress substations have also been presented.  
The physical construction of the sub-transmission systems made no provision to 
allow circuit breakers to be installed in Stafford for the outgoing feeders as well as 
no provision made for 132 kV circuit breakers to be installed at the receiving end 
Stoney Drift substation has been presented. BCMM’s sub-transmission main 
equipment, problem categorization and factors affecting the lower reliability 
performance have been presented.    
● Blackouts: The case study of BCMM’s sub-transmission network blackouts, 
impacts from the regular outage and restoration process have been presented, and 
blackout mitigation as well as prevention are studied. The nonexistence of pilot 
wires between Stafford switchyard and Stoney Drift substation and non-
responsiveness of protective device have been reviewed.  
● Exploration of equipment reliability performance: Protection system security and 
dependability, aging equipment and maintenance have been investigated. 
● Load flow study: Perform a load flow study of the existing and alternative (1) 
models utilising DIgSILENT Power Factory to assess the capacity of the network 
to meet the required load balancing and fault level calculation. A network models 
was prepared and used to study the network under various loading scenarios.  The 
comparison of fault level scenarios made provision to allow precise overcurrent 
and earth fault relay settings.    
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● Discussions: Discussions on a desk study of possible solutions, and selection of 
best solution that uses decision making approach have been made. 
 ● Provisional cost estimated: Based on the interim and long-term scenarios, plans 
and schedules, provisional estimates were prepared using BCMM’s database prices 
and costs estimating tools together with the occasional budget price from suppliers 
for high cost items.  
 
The existing network supply from Eskom is deteriorating and has lower reliability 
performance level. The insufficient level of adequacy and security provides 
vulnerability for the network to experiencing regular power interruptions. Stoney 
Drift and Progress substations are currently loaded to their capacity limits. The load 
balancing emanate from an analysis of the available simulation result of the 
alternative (1) scenario provides interim solutions to BCMM’s reliability problems.  
 
7.2 Recommendations 
This section aims to provide a concise summary of a key recommendations made 
in this dissertation in a specific order. The order is based on factors influencing 
lower level reliability performances are recommended. 
 
7.2.1 Aging infrastructure equipment 
If it is to manage aging infrastructure equipment and its effect on reliability 
performance, well applicable generalization strategy that can be applied to aging 
utility infrastructure is as follows: 
(a) Overhead lines: Visual inspections must be carried out at reasonable pace of 
intervals. A visual inspection will identify loose components, improper grounding, 
missing notices, problem trees and problem structures to be maintained; 
● Conductor corrosion can be detected by an eddy-current technique to detect the 
galvanic corrosion process in steel reinforced aluminium conductor [82];  
● Inspection, maintenance and service priorities must be different for older 
equipment; 
● Information on age, condition, and service and maintenance history must be the 
key to salvage older equipment; and 
● Condition monitoring technique implementation is highly recommended. 
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(b) Transformers: Transformers must be visually inspected at regular intervals for 
rust and leakages. Condition of the transformer oil must be tested for dielectric 
breakdown, water content, power factor, flashpoint, corrosive sulfur, viscosity, 
dissolved gas analysis etc. and carried out preventative maintenance; 
● Electrical testing must be carried out for insulation resistance, loss angle, partial 
discharge and low voltage impulse; 
● Oil filled bushing and tap changers must be tested for gas in the oil; and 
●All ancillary transformer equipment and instrumentation must be visually 
inspected and tested regularly for planned maintenance.   
(c) Circuit breakers: Visual inspection and maintenance must be carried out on 
outdoor switchgear/circuit breakers to identify corrosion, cleaning, painting and 
regular servicing; and 
● Prevent rodents and other small animals from nesting in pad-mounted equipment 
is necessary and carried out preventative maintenance.     
 
7.2.2 Planned preventative maintenance 
This dissertation recommend planned preventative maintenance (PPM) strategy to 
be adapted as one of the techniques to mitigate BCMM’s lower reliability 
problems. Planned preventive maintenance (PPM) is to maintain the infrastructure 
equipment before failure. Therefore, a balance needs to exist between the frequency 
and extension of maintenance carried out. Routine inspection with equipment 
check list and planning must be exercised to planned preventative maintenance. 
Implementation of PPM will reduce maintenance costs and increase reliability 
performance level. 
 
7.2.3 Protection system on BC’s network 
In this dissertation, operating a line without pilot protection scheme was discussed.  
The possible interim solution to the current scenario is as follows:  
● Modify the relay settings/wiring to emulate pilot tripping is recommended. If the 
line is needed for load flow capability but instability or severe voltage sags for slow 
clearing of faults is a risk, then some other alternatives to provide fast clearing are 
possible. Recommended alternatives to be considered are as follows: 
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● Extend the Zone 1 reach to at least 100% of the line;  
● Shorten the Zone 2 timer to zero or near zero to provide faster clearing for Zone 
2 faults; and  
● Jumper the PT (permissive trip) input for a permissive overreaching transfer trip 
(POTT) scheme to enable a pilot trip even though the channel is unavailable or 
degraded.  
Caution should be taken when utilizing these solutions, as all these modifications 
have vulnerability to lines incorrectly tripping for faults external to the line. In the 
long-term; 
● Install pilot protection scheme to restore Buffalo City’s sub-transmission 
network pilot protection scheme. 
● Verify that the control and protection systems operate properly and provide the 
appropriate alarms, relay communication and co-ordination. 
● Testing and maintenance must be carried out at reasonable intervals 
● Traveling wave based protection for transmission line, can be used for fast fault 
detection. 
 
7.2.4 Load flow on BC’s network 
The concept of load flow analysis is also true when all reasons of faults are 
considered for simulation. From the power system point of view, condition of each 
component or line should be satisfied with the normal voltage loading level for 
operational excellence and long technical life time.   
● Load flow analysis to determine how the electrical network system must be 
performed after normal and emergency operating conditions. This will yielding 
provision of information needed to optimize circuit usage, develop practical 
voltage profiles, minimize kW and kVar losses, develop equipment specification 
guidelines and identify transformer tap settings. 
● Perform LFA to decrease unexpected downtime;  
● Carry out load flow analysis to reduce operating and maintenance costs; and  
● Carry out LFA to identify capacity out of existing assets.  
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7.2.5 Fault level on BC’s network 
Fault level calculation is necessary to ensure that all the components in the power 
system can safely handle the maximum fault currents if fault do occur.  
● Fault level analysis must be carried out by BCMM for additional load on the 
network if required.  
● Fault level must also be used to decide circuit breaker rating in power system.  
● It is further recommended that, purchases of new switchgears should be decided 
on the basis of three phase short circuit current.  
● Recommendation is emphasised on the importance of taken into account fault 
level for the selection of protective devices capable to withstand fault current and 
break the specified limit as predetermined.  
 
All these recommendations can take time and resources to implement effectively. 
Thus, with only a limited funds available, it will be important for BCMM to 
consider the relative cost-benefits in the interim solutions provided in terms of 
efficiency and reliability improvement activities. Adaptation of the alternative (1) 
network model of BCMM’s sub-transmission provides the best results in network 
loading, relay responsiveness, upkeep and maintenance strategy for reliability 
improvement.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: Common-cause failure model 
Appendix A is a model of common cause of failure on power system component. 
Four major stages, each of which contains a number of steps, form the procedural 
framework for the analysis. Figure A.1 summarizes the main elements of the 
framework. Some comments are given below, including the references to the 
sections of the present guidelines, which specifically cover the underlying 
concepts. For detailed definitions, we refer to the original reference (Mosleh et al., 
1988, 1989). 
Stage 1 - System Logic Model Development is covered in the general guidelines 
for PSA (IAEA, 1992). This stage is a prerequisite for common-cause failure 
analysis. Aspects related to the interface between this stage and the subsequent 
ones will be touched upon. 
Stage 2 - Identification of Common-Cause Component Groups focuses on the 
screening process and is critical for definition of the scope of the detailed analysis. 
Stage 3 – Common-Cause Modelling and Data Analysis - A definition of common-
cause failure is defined as multiple failures of components from shared root 
causes. The incorporation of common-cause events in the logic model is achieved 
by a straightforward modification of its structure. The selection of models for 
quantification of CCF contributions and the analysis and manipulation of data 
constitute the tasks that call for most guidance.   
Stage 4 - System Quantification and Interpretation of Results synthesises the key 
output of the previous stages leading to quantification of system failure probability. 
In addition, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses provide additional perspective for 
interpretation of results.  
 
Stage 1 - System Logic Model Development 
Steps 
1.1 System Familiarization 
1.2 Problem Definition 
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1.3 Logic Model Development 
 
Stage 2 - Identification of Common-Cause Component Groups 
Steps 
2.1 Qualitative Analysis 
2.2 Quantitative Screening 
Stage 3 – Common-Cause Modelling and Data Analysis 
3.1 Definition of Common-Cause Basic Events 
3.2 Selection of Probability Models for Common-Cause 
Basic Events 
3.3 Data Classification and Screening 
3.4 Parameter Estimation                                   
 
Stage 4 - System Quantification and Interpretation of Results 
4.1 Quantification 
4.2 Results Evaluation and Sensitivity Analysis 
4.3 Reporting 
 
Figure A.1 Procedural framework for common-cause failure analysis  
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APPENDIX B: Outages and the impact on consumers 
In this appendix, a brief description of the impact consumers experienced when 
power outage occur on power system network is presented. 
  
Electric service interruptions occur when system capacity is exhausted, aging 
transmission equipment fails to operate due to lack of planned maintenance or is 
insufficient to meet the system load levels. Electricity supply interruption could 
also occur in the event of a fault on the network system and this phenomenon is 
either a minor or a major scenario depending on the magnitude of the fault. During 
these periods of inadequacy, outage costs will be borne by the utility, its customers 
and perhaps, by the entire society. The utility outage costs include loss of revenue, 
loss of future sales, and increased repair expenditure and maintenance expenditure. 
These costs usually form only a small part of the total outage costs. The greater 
part is that borne by the consumers. The outage costs depend on many factors and 
situations, some of which are discussed in the following sections. The perceived 
costs of an electric outage and the point in time when a consumer would like to buy 
electric energy but is unable to do so, affects the problem of estimating outage 
costs. Since there are different classes of consumers, each will tolerate loss of 
service differently.  
 
A residential consumer may suffer a great deal of hardship if an outage occurs 
during a hot summers day or while he is engaging in domestic activities but it may 
be of little inconvenience to a commercial user who is forced to close until power 
is restored. In addition, an outage may cause a great loss to an industrial user if it 
occurs during the time of the production process. Therefore, consumers do not 
perceive service interruption to the same degree of hardship. The outage costs to a 
particular consumer also depend on the alternatives available to that individual at 
the time of service interruption. If the outages are not expected, the consumer may 
have very limited alternatives and may incur a great loss. On the other hand, if an 
adequate warning is given, the losses may be averted or mitigated. 
 
In addition, as an outage continues or spreads to a larger subset of society, the 
society cost will tend to increase and will include such indirect costs as effects from 
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anxiety, loss of products, food spoilage, health hazards, etc. The major aspect of 
outage costs estimation is to assess the worth of power system reliability in order 
to compare it with the cost of power system to establish an appropriate system 
reliability level. In this regard, it is important to realise that, while the evaluation 
of power system reliability has become a well-established practice over the last 
decade, the assessment of the worth of reliability or conversely, the estimation of 
costs of losses that result from system unreliability, is still immature. The major 
reason for this is that the quantification of interruption costs is an intricate and often 
a subjective task.  
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APPENDIX C: Protections in electric power systems 
In this appendix a brief summary of how protections are designed and how they 
function is given. The very important distance protections and their operating 
principles are discussed. Some special protections and system wide protections that 
are of relevance for power system stability is briefly reviewed. 
ifferent types of protections are installed to protect the equipment in an electric 
power system. Their task is to disconnect failed or overloaded equipment or parts 
of the system to avoid unnecessary damages on equipment and personnel. The 
purpose is also to limit the impact of failures on the parts of the system that have 
not failed. Special types of protection are the “system protections”. Their task is to 
prevent collapse (black out) of the system or parts of the system. 
 
An intensive development of protections based on modern information technology 
is going on both regarding hardware and software. On the hardware side 
microprocessors have been used over a long time to implement different functions 
in the protections, and with the recent developments more and more complicated 
functions can be implemented in a reliable way. Powerful methods like signal 
processing, state estimation, and “artificial intelligence”, are being integrated into 
the protections. In general the functions which earlier were handled with separate 
relays are increasingly being integrated with other functional units for control and 
supervision. Furthermore, more complicated criteria for activation of protections 
can be applied. The interested reader is referred to the literature for further 
information. The summary here is concentrated on misoperation of protections 
devices. 
C.1 Design of protections 
A protection for an electric power system comprises the following parts: 
• Measurement device with current- and/or voltage transformers and other 
sensors measuring the relevant quantities. 
D 
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• Relay which when certain conditions are fulfilled sends signals to a circuit 
breaker or another switching device. This relay was earlier a separate unit, but can 
in modern protections be a part of a larger unit for protection, supervision and 
control. 
• Circuit breakers which execute the given instruction(s) from the relay. 
• Telecommunication system is mainly used at distance (line) protections to get a 
faster and more reliable performance. 
• Power supply systems which shall secure the power supply to the protection 
system, even with faults in the system. 
The requirements on a protection system are that they should be dependable, 
secure, selective, sensitive, and fast. 
• Dependability means that the protection should react and do its action when a 
fault occurs for which it is designed to react for. To achieve desired dependability 
double or even triple sets of certain parts of the protection or of signal paths might 
be needed. Malfunctions can be divided into not occurring or unwanted operations. 
Normally none occurring operations are more serious malfunctions than unwanted 
ones. 
• Security means that the protection should not react when no fault occurs or when 
a fault for which its not intended to react occurs. 
• Selectivity implies that not more than necessary pieces of equipment and 
apparatuses are disconnected to isolate a fault. 
• Sensitivity is needed to detect failures which cause small fault currents, e.g. high 
impedance faults. This implies that the risk for misoperations increases at “small” 
disturbances, e.g. at energisation of transformers, or at high load operation but 
normal operation. 
• The protection should react fast to secure that damages on persons and 
equipment are prevented or limited. 
The protections are often classified according to the object that they protect. An 
example is shown in Figure C.1. If a failure occurs within an indicated area in 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY  
                                                                                 REFERENCES 
  
 
99 
 
Figure C.1 this area should be isolated from the rest of the network. Many of the 
protections which protect separate pieces of equipment or parts of a system with 
occupy a limited physical area are so called current differential protections. These 
protections measure the difference between two currents, which in normal 
operation should be equal, and the protection is activated if this deviation exceeds 
a predetermined value. Both differences in amplitude and phase can trigger the 
relay. The principle for a current differential protection is shown in Figure B.2. 
 
C.2. Distance Protections 
 
Figure C.1: The different protection zones in a power systems. 
C.2 Distance protections 
C.2.1 General principles 
So called distance protections are important protections concerning stability and 
dynamics in a power system. Their task is to disconnect faulted lines or cables. 
Since large parts of the power system consist physically of lines and these are 
exposed to different disturbances, e.g. lightning strokes, down falling trees etc., it 
is important that those faults can be isolated to minimise the impact on the rest of 
the system. The most common faults are ground (earth) faults, i.e. short circuits 
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between two or more phases and ground (shunt faults). Also interruptions in the 
lines can occur (series faults). The operating principle of the distance protection is 
shown in Figure C.3. 
 
Current and voltage are measured in both ends of the line and from these an 
apparent impedance can be calculated: Z = U/I. In normal operation this impedance 
varies within a certain area (large and almost resistive values on Z), but if a fault 
occurs it will drastically change. The given value depends on where on the line the 
failure occurs, and from system parameters as line data and short circuit capacity, 
it can be calculated where the fault has occurred. For each distance protection there 
are several protection zones defined in the Z plane according to Figure C.4. A low 
value on Z implies that the fault is close to the measurement. From line data and 
short circuit capacity  
 
Figure C.2: Principles of a current differential protection. 
 
Figure C.3: The operating principle of a distance protection. 
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it can then be decided if the fault is in the protected line, within Zone 1, or not. If 
that is the case, a trip order is given to the breaker at the same station within some 
milliseconds, typically 10 ms, after Z has reached Zone 1. At the same time a trip 
order is given to the breaker in the other end of the line. This latter trip order is not 
needed for isolation of the fault, if the protection system in the other end works as 
it should, but this trip order (transfer trip) increases the security in the system. 
If the measured value on Z is in Zone 2 or 3, it implies that the fault is outside the 
actual line. This implies that neither breaker 1 nor 2 in Figure C.3 shall be opened. 
If the breakers, which according to the protection plane should isolate the fault, are 
not operated by some reason, other breakers which are further away from the fault 
must isolate it. These secondary 
 
Figure C.4: Different zones in a distance protection. 
breakers will be used first after it is clear that the primary breakers have not isolated 
the fault. Therefore if, Z is in Zone 2, the breaker does not get the trip order until 
typically some hundred milliseconds have passed. 
 
To coordinate and tune the settings of the protections to give a fast, reliable, 
sensitive and selective protection system is a complicated and an important task in 
an electric power system. In modern protection systems different areas can be 
defined according to Figure C.4 with in principal arbitrary geometric shapes, which 
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facilitates the work. A plan comprising the different areas of protections and time 
settings is usually called a selectivity plan. The work to establish a selectivity plan 
is often very time consuming because it should be appropriate for every feasible 
state of operation, i.e. for different numbers of generators and lines connected and 
also at different load levels. Often trade-offs must be made to reach acceptable 
results. 
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APPENDIX D: Maintenance strategies 
In general, maintenance is either planned or unplanned as shown in Figure D1. 
Corrective maintenance is a reactive strategy that is unplanned and is carried out 
after failure has occurred. The intention is to restore an item to a state that can 
perform its required function. Planned maintenance strategies are proactive in 
nature and can be divided into two groups: Preventive and Condition Monitoring. 
Preventive maintenance, sometimes called scheduled, is a maintenance carried out 
at regular intervals.  
D.1 Maintenance on transmission network 
Maintenance on primary transmission lines has been a major challenge with regard 
to the adaption of planned preventative Maintenance (PPM) or reliability centred 
maintenance (RCM) strategy. Power outages become eminent when the utility 
company has no planned maintenance programme in place. 
 
Figure D.1: Maintenance strategies  
 
Unfortunately, BCMM has no planned maintenance strategy to mitigate regular 
power outages on the network. The maintenance practice available is reactive or 
corrective maintenance. Corrective maintenance is a reactive strategy that is 
unplanned and carried out after failure occurred. The intention is to restore an item 
to a state that can perform its required function. Corrective maintenance 
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performance does not effectively contribute to reliability improvement of the 
power system. Sections D.2 expound different proactive maintenance strategies 
(Reliability Centred Maintenance and Planned Preventive Maintenance) available 
for adaption by the BCMM maintenance team.  
D.2 Reliability centred maintenance    
RCM, as has been mainly applied to nuclear power plants, often requires the largest 
amount of maintenance because of safety and environmental considerations. 
However, with these successful programs now operating, fossil power plants, and 
power transmission and distribution systems have recently been getting into the 
mix. Because these facilities faced lesser restrictive regulatory challenges, they 
should be able to apply the streamlines forms of RCM directly and much more 
easily, thus reducing the implementation costs. 
 
RCM is a set of methods and tools aimed at helping a utility to determine the 
minimum set of preventive maintenance tasks necessary to address critical 
equipment failures appropriately without compromising service reliability. RCM 
is a structured process used to determine optimal maintenance requirements for 
equipment in a particular operating environment. It combines the strategies of 
corrective maintenance, preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, and 
applies these strategies where each is appropriate, based on the consequence and 
frequency of functional failures. This combination produces a maintenance 
program that optimizes both reliability and cost effectiveness. For major pieces of 
equipment, such as power transformers, RCM may indicate that predictive 
maintenance is an attractive option, given the decreasing cost of sensor and 
diagnostic technology and the increasing cost of running the equipment to failure.  
 
RCM is a condition-based maintenance program that focuses on preventing failures 
that are likely to be the most serious. RCM and Predictive Maintenance (PdM) 
analyses complement each other, and when performed concurrently, offer an 
excellent approach to maintenance optimisation. In the last few years, the 
sophistication of monitoring equipment on the market and the falling price of 
electronics and computers has made the on-site monitoring applications a cost-
effective reality.  
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APPENDIX E: Procedures for DIgSILENT simulation and results 
The steps to take in order to perform load flow simulation is as follows: 
Step 1.  Data gathering 
● Single line diagram: Determine the interconnection of the network 
● Maps: Determine location of substations and estimate line lengths, conceptualize 
loads 
● Substations: Configuration of substation equipment i.e. power transformers, 
reactive devices, configuration of busbars, feeders, NEC 
● Overhead lines: Line lengths, conductor types, special arrangement of conductors 
and earth wires 
● Power transformers: Voltages, capacity, vector group, impedances, tap changer 
information, zero sequence impedance 
● Loads: scenarios for high load, low load, summer load, winder load, load 
forecast. 
Step 2.  Build network in dig-silent power factory 
● Model Eskom point of supply at Buffalo 132 kV substation 
● Stafford 132kV switchyard 
● Stafford-Progress 132 kV lines 1, 2 & 3 
● Progress-Stoney Drift 132 kV lines 1, 2 & 3 
● Progress 132/11 kV substation 
● Stoney Drift 132/33/11 kV substation 
● Entry zero sequence data of transformers 
● Entry NEC/R data 
● Enter zero sequence and negative sequence data for overhead lines 
Step 3.  Run load flow:  
● Select method: IEC60909 or ANSI or IEC61361 
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E1: Load flow simulation result of the existing network 
 
Figure E.1: Load flow simulation results at Eskom’s Buffalo substation and 
Stafford switchyard. 
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E2: Simulation result of the existing network at Stoney Drift 
 
Figure E.2: Load flow simulation in Stoney Drift substation 
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E3: Simulation result of the existing network at Progress. 
 
 
Figure E.3: Load flow simulation result at Progress substation. 
 
 
 
 
E4: Simulation result of the alternative (1) network at Stafford 
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Figure E4: Alternative (1) network simulation at Stafford switchyard 
 E5: Simulation result of the alternative (1) network at Stoney Drift 
Figure E5: Alternative (1) network simulation at Stoney Drift substation 
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E6: Simulation result of the alternative (1) network at Progress 
 
Figure E6: Alternative (1) network simulation at Progress substation. 
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APPENDIX F: Fault level simulation and manual calculations 
F1: BCMM’s manual fault level calculations of the existing network 
There are four methods and each of them can be utilized (infinite bus, ohmic, per 
unit and MVA) for fault level calculations, interestingly, they all arrive in the same 
answer with minor differences in decimal figures.  For this manual calculation, the 
MVA method will be used. 
 
F2: Assumptions commonly made in three phase fault  
The following assumptions are usually made in fault analysis in three phase 
transmission lines.  
● All sources are balanced and equal in magnitude & phase   
● Sources represented by the Thevenin’s voltage prior to fault at the fault point   
● Large systems may be represented by an infinite bus-bars  
● Transformers are on nominal tap position  
● Resistances are negligible compared to reactances   
● Transmission lines are assumed fully transposed and all 3 phases have same Z   
● Loads currents are negligible compared to fault currents   
● Line charging currents can be completely neglected. 
The MVA method is a modification of the ohmic method. The first step is to 
convert the typical BCMM’s single line diagram to the equivalent MVA single line 
diagram, and then to reduce the MVA single line diagram into a single MVA value 
at the point of fault. The component of a typical BC’s single line are the utility 
source, transformers, buses and transmission lines. Figure F.1 shows a typical 
BCMM’s single line diagram. 
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Figure F.1: Typical BCMM’s primary power system single line diagram. 
 
F3:  Three phase MVA single line  
Figure F.4 is the equivalent MVA single line of the typical BCMM’s network of 
Figure F.3. The next step is to reduce the MVA single line to single MVA value at 
the point of fault. The reduction uses basic mathematics, either “add up” the MVA 
values or “parallel up” the MVA values. Figure F.4 illustrates the steps for the 
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reduction of the MVA single line to a single MVA value at the point of fault. The 
fault level for a 3 phase fault at 11 kV is 390 MVA or 17 kA. 
 
 
Figure F.2: BCMM’s equivalent MVA value single line diagram 
 
132 BCMM’s source in Stafford switchyard 
The MVA value is √3𝑥132𝑥11.2 = 2561 MVA    (4.1) 
Stafford switchyard has 11.2 kA fault level  
20 MVA transformer in Progress substation 
 IMPROVING BUFFALO CITY’S SUB-TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY  
                                                                                 REFERENCES 
  
 
114 
 
The MVA value is 
20
0.06
 = 333 MVA     (4.2) 
The transformer has 6% impedance  
90 MVA transformer in Stoney Drift substation 
The MVA value is 
90
0.16
 = 563 MVA     (4.3) 
The transformer has 16% impedance 
16 MVA transformer in chiselhurst substation 
The MVA value is 
16
0.07
 = 229 MVA     (4.4) 
The transformer has 7% impedance 
132 kV Wolf overhead conductor 
The MVA value will be 
𝑉²
𝑍
 
Where V is the phase to phase voltage kV 
             Z is the per phase impedance in ohm. 
The MVA value will be 
132 𝑥 132
0.2
 = 968 MVA   (4.5) 
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Figure F.3: MVA reduction steps diagrams 
( 
1
2561
 + 
1
968
 ) = 702 MVA      (4.6) 
 
( 
1
702
 + 
1
333
 + 
1
563
 ) = 161 MVA     (4.7) 
MVA Parallel = MVA1 + MVA2 
161 + 229 = 390 MVA       (4.8) 
       3 phase fault current = 
390
(1.732 𝑥 11)
 = 20.5 kA    
   
         (4.9) 
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F.4 Single phase to earth fault 
The above calculations were for three phase fault. The MVA method can be used 
to calculate single phase to earth fault, as illustrated in Figure. F.6. The positive 
sequence MVA will be the value calculated in the previous calculations and in the 
most applications, the positive sequence MVA will be the same as the negative 
MVA. The zero sequence MVA however, will usually be different from the 
positive MVA. For example in Figure F.3, only 16 MVA transformer will 
contribute to the earth fault at 11 kV through the neutral connected earth. 
 
Figure F.4: MVA reduction diagram for single phase to earth fault. 
Fault level MVA 
( 
1
390
 + 
1
390
 + 
1
229
 ) = 111 MVA     (4.9) 
Single phase to earth fault = 3 x 111 MVA 
      = 333 MVA 
 
333
(1.732 𝑥11)
    = 17.5 kA at 11 kV 
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F.5 Sequence MVA  
Positive sequence MVA = MVA1 = 390 
Negative sequence MVA = MVA2 = 390 and  
Zero sequence = MVA0 = 229 
 
F.6 Advantages of the MVA method      
The advantages of the MVA method of calculating fault level are as follows: 
● There is no need to convert impedance from one voltage to another, this is a 
requirement in the ohmic method. 
● There is no need to select a common MVA base and then convert the data to the 
common MVA base, this is a requirement in per unit method. The formulas for 
conversion are complex and not easy to remember. 
 ● Both ohmic method and per unit method usually end up with small decimals. It 
is more prone to make mistakes in the decimal with resulting errors several others 
of magnitude from the correct value.  
 ● The MVA method uses large whole numbers and this makes for easier 
manipulation and hence less prone to errors. 
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